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Innovation, 
Intellectual Property, 
and Development:
A BETTER SET OF 
APPROACHES FOR 
THE 21st CENTURY.
6The twenty first century global economy will differ from that of the twentieth in 
at least two critical ways. First, the weight of the developing world in the global 
economy will be substantially higher. In particular, emerging economies such 
as China, Brazil, India and South Africa will have a more important role to play 
based on their pace of growth. Second, the ‘weightless economy‘ - the economy 
of ideas, knowledge and information - will become an increasingly important 
fraction of economic output and ever more important for economic growth and 
development, both in developed and developing economies.
These two facts alone would suggest that economic institutions and laws 
created in the twentieth century, to manage the growth of currently advanced 
industrialised economies, will be increasingly inadequate to govern global 
economic activity. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). Today’s global intellectual property regimes have been 
strongly affected by the historical evolution of IPR in the United States and in the 
advanced industrialised countries over the last century. Certainly, the adoption 
of the World Trade Organization’s Trade Related Intellectual Property System 
(TRIPS) reflects the understanding of the management of intellectual and 
knowledge advancement that prevailed in the last quarter of the previous century 
and the structure of economic power at that moment.4 
Perhaps somewhat ironically the world has coalesced on a set of institutions to 
manage knowledge advancement just as advanced industrialised economies 
have begun to run up against the severe impediments that this system entails - a 
system that they thought had been designed by and for themselves. Nowadays, 
it is widely recognised that the management of innovation in countries like the 
US has been sub-optimal and led to a situation that is increasingly litigious 
and plagued by conflicts. In fields such as information technology, a whole 
set of weak patents and an epidemic of over-patenting has made subsequent 
innovation difficult and has eroded some of the gains from knowledge creation 
(see Bessen and Meurer, 2008 among others). Moreover, in some areas, such 
as in pharmaceuticals, ever-stronger IP protections has not necessarily led 
to an increase in the discovery of new chemical entities (see Dosi and Stiglitz, 
2014). Rather, the demands and needs of different industries become more 
opposed, leading to serious concerns for policy makers. There is a shrinking of 
the knowledge commons as even publicly funded and promoted innovation is 
privatised,5 thereby reducing both equity and efficiency. There is no agreement 
on what exactly ought to be done, but it is certainly recognised that the current 
system is not satisfactory for developed countries.
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7This dissatisfaction with the current regime is magnified in the case of developing 
countries. Ever since the adoption of TRIPS, it has become increasingly clear that 
the intellectual property provisions of the WTO are not well-aligned with the needs 
of developing countries and that they serve corporate interests in developed 
countries disproportionately. These conflicts become more pronounced over time. 
For example, in the case of extending patent protection to global pharmaceutical 
companies at the expense of the health of the poor, or extending copyright for 
books well past the time needed to compensate the author, thereby limiting 
access to books and educational materials in developing countries.
If the knowledge economy and the economy of ideas is to be a key part of the 
global economy and if static societies are to be transformed into ‘learning 
societies’ that are key for growth and development (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
2006, 2014 for more on this theme), there is a desperate need to rethink the 
current regime and to allow for a much less restrictive flow of information and 
knowledge. Moreover, if we are considering questions of ethics, the current 
regime is deeply regressive and inefficient as we will show.
This paper aims to provide an intellectual basis to think about the relationship 
between development, intellectual property and innovation; where we currently 
are and what alternatives are available. For the most part, we are concerned less 
with the implications of current IP laws for the advanced countries as we are 
with their impact on developing countries. We focus here not only on the current 
pathologies of the system and on potential alternative ways to tackle its most 
egregious excesses; but on a more positive note, on what kind of “system” would 
best promote development and well-being in the developing world.6 We are 
looking for a world with new and better rules for intellectual property. Just as 
some have begun to think about re-writing the rules of the American economy to 
ensure a more just and efficient system,7 the time is ripe for doing the same for 
the global economy, especially with regard to the IP system.
This paper begins by outlining the basic logic for the implementation of 
intellectual property rights and detail alternatives to providing private monopolies 
to promote innovation. We then turn to the question of intellectual property 
rights and the process of development. Both theory and the preponderance of 
historical evidence suggest that development, at least in its initial stages, is best 
promoted by a weaker intellectual property regime than reflected in TRIPS, or at 
the minimum a markedly different regime. In particular, we show that the current 
global regime of intellectual property rights is inadequate in serving the purpose 
of economic development and welfare. We then examine an extensive set of case 
studies in which the current regime has proved to be ineffective and a hindrance 
to welfare. These are in the areas of food security, education and climate change. 
We go on to provide a simple laundry list of ways in which better laws could 
facilitate development and prevent the worst excesses of the global IP regime.
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9The justification for creating patent and copyright monopolies, as well as other 
forms of intellectual property, is that without the ability to appropriate the returns 
to their innovative activities granted by these monopolies, the market would 
undersupply research, innovation, and creative work—or at least that would be 
the case without some form of direct support from the government. While the 
initial investment to generate the “idea” in these areas is costly, reproducing it 
(e.g. by copying or backward engineering) is generally inexpensive. This means 
that the innovator or creator will not be able to recover the cost of their investment 
if their output is sold in a competitive market. For example, in the classic case of 
prescription drugs, the generic price will not allow an innovator sufficient profit to 
recover the cost of developing the drug. Competition among generic producers 
will drive the price down to the marginal cost of production, leaving no ’rent‘ to 
compensate for the cost of research. Similarly, for creative works, like recorded 
music, movies, or books, the near zero cost of transfer over the Internet provides 
no opportunity for recouping the cost of creating the work. Providing an innovator 
the legal right to exclude others from production gives him or her the freedom to 
price above marginal cost, to charge high enough prices to recoup the cost of the 
first copy. While this may promote some innovation, it does so at the expense of 
social efficiency, since prices are above the marginal cost of production/ usage.8
Granting a monopoly for a limited period of time in the form of a patent is therefore 
one solution. Research is incentivised, but at the cost of inefficiency in the 
current usage of knowledge. There is a static/ dynamic trade-off. More stringent 
intellectual property (e.g. longer patents) might promote more innovation, but at 
the expense of longer periods during which knowledge is not well used. 
In fact, many firms choose not to patent their innovations—Coca Cola has long 
relied on trade secrets - and in some areas (like metallurgy) this appears to be the 
standard practice. Even without patents, the innovator may be able to appropriate 
large returns, for instance from the ’first mover advantage,’ that is, being the first 
firm in the field.  In the world of hi-tech, the open source approach has been highly 
successful, with firms gleaning returns from providing services based on their 
deep knowledge of the successful programs that they helped write.  
2. The basic logic of intellectual 
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Still, much of the literature on innovation has focused on the patent system and 
intellectual property rights more generally, and the immense literature on these 
subjects has focused on two questions: (a) the design of the optimal intellectual 
property regime, with each provision (e.g. the length of the patent, its breadth, 
the standard of novelty, the manner in which patents are enforced) balancing out 
dynamic and static efficiency; and (b) the assessment of whether, overall, the 
creation of monopolies through patents is a good way of incentivising research. 
The argument has been made and elaborated below, that there are much better 
alternatives.  
  
Early advocates of monopoly as a catalyst for innovation, most notably 
Schumpeter, argued that the distortion arising from a temporary monopoly 
would disappear once the forces of competition could come into play—or at least 
that these static distortions were more than compensated for by the benefits 
of increased innovation. Competition for the market, understood as better, less 
expensive and more products, replaces competition in the market, understood as 
competition between firms. He also argued that as a result, monopolies would 
only be temporary. Schumpeter never proved these arguments, and later research 
questioned all of the underlying assumptions and conclusions in his analysis.9 
Thus, for example, Stiglitz (1988), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) and Fudenberg et 
al (1983) argued that granting monopolies not only provided weak incentives to 
innovate, and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) showed that a monopolist could and 
would entrench its dominant position.10
Thus, the intellectual property rights system affects not only static efficiency 
during the life of the patent, but also the dynamic path of innovation. It does this 
in a variety of other ways. For instance, the patent system has a direct influence 
on the technological opportunities available to innovators and therefore on 
the generation of new products. (Stiglitz, 2014). A patent can set immediate 
constraints on the paths which can be followed by innovators. This problem 
becomes further exacerbated when knowledge is ’complex‘ and pathways of 
innovation are complementary or interdependent. It does this not only by taking 
out of the pool of knowledge ideas that others can draw upon (even as it may 
incentivise research that contributes to new additions to that pool), but also by 
affecting incentives in the design of research strategies. Currently predominant 
IPR regimes may bias research towards ’quick‘, patentable results rather than long 
run research projects. At the very least, there is a bias towards research strategies 
where there are patentable intermediate products, with the result that the overall 
pace of innovation may be lower than it otherwise would have been. (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 2014). Patent systems that allow for utility patents—patenting ’small 
steps,’ especially on how a product is used—may provide encouragement for new 
entry, and may be especially important in developing countries. But such patents 
may, at the same time, also be used as a barrier to follow on bigger innovations.  
Even in the United States and other advanced industrialised countries, the patent 
system is in a period of crisis. There is widespread concern over the proliferation 
of weak patents—those that are not real advances on existing knowledge but that 
are granted for a variety of reasons, including a structural bias towards granting 
patents in the patent offices of advanced industrialised economies. Weak patents 
can provide an impediment to follow-on innovation, while providing at best weak 
11
incentives for innovative activities themselves.11 The myriad of patents has 
created a ’patent thicket‘, that in some sectors has not encouraged innovation, 
but on the contrary, has encouraged litigation. These problems are especially 
important in complex products (like a computer chip) where the production 
entails dozens of patents. The patent thicket has been exploited by patent trolls, 
i.e. law firms that buy up patents that look for possible infringement by important 
patents.
Moreover, as Henry and Stiglitz (2010) note, challenging a patent is a public good 
- it opens up the knowledge commons; in contrast to seeking a patent, which 
effectively privatises the commons. As always, there is an undersupply of public 
goods -implying that there will be too many patents granted because too few will 
be challenged.12 
  
A poorly designed IPR regime may thus result in societal losses both in the short 
run and the long term. 
The underlying problem is that knowledge is a (global) public good - in the 
technical sense that the marginal cost of someone using knowledge is zero13, 
and, as is usually the case, the market undersupplies public goods. Creating 
private monopolies through patents is just one route for solving the problem of 
incentivising and financing research. 
More broadly, there are marked discrepancies between private and social returns 
under the patent system. We shall discuss many of the discrepancies between 
private and social returns under the patent system later.
There are actually a variety of alternative ways of financing and incentivising 
research, within the current dispensation, many of which are in use today in 
different countries and contexts.
For simplicity, these approaches can be categorised as:
1. Direct financing through centralised mechanisms – where a government 
agency directly finances research and/or creative work. The National Institutes of 
Health and the National Science Foundation in the United States are examples of 
centralised direct support for research. Many countries have some form of arts 
or culture council that supports creative work of various types.
2. Decentralised direct funding mechanisms – where research and/or creative 
work is directly supported and/or incentivised through a decentralised mechanism. 
A tax credit for research and development is one mechanism in this category; a 
Even in the United States and other 
advanced industrialised countries, the 
patent system is in a period of crisis.
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tax credit means that the government is effectively paying part of the research 
costs. Another example is the tax deduction for charitable contributions for 
universities and other institutions to support research or creative activities in the 
United States. In this case, the government is effectively subsidising the spending 
of private individuals.14 Another example is the tax deduction for charitable 
contributions for universities and other institutions to support research or 
creative activities in the United States. In this case, the government is effectively 
subsidizing the spending of private individuals.
Neither of these systems requires patent or copyright monopolies, since the work 
is paid for upfront. On the other hand, we can have systems that finance research 
and creative work through ‘market based’ mechanisms, as described below.
3. Prize financing system – this is a system where a governmental body or a 
private foundation/research institution awards a prize for a successful innovation 
(or other creative activity). There have been some famous historical examples of 
prize systems, most notably the prize posted by the British government in 1714 
for a method to accurately measure longitude, and another posted by the Royal 
Society for Arts and Technology for a mechanical solution to replace chimney 
sweeps. While prize systems are not currently in widespread use by governments, 
there are many prizes being privately offered. In recent years, there have been 
proposals in the US to provide prizes for drugs research (as proposed by Senator 
Sanders15) and for the development of renewable energy.
The patent, of course, is a prize (see below). Here, however, it is as if the 
government (or other party offering the prize) buys the patent, based on an 
assessment of its value, and then places it in the public domain so that its 
benefits could be realised as fully as possible, since it would be available at a 
relatively low licensing fee.     
4. Patent ‘prize’ financing decentralised system – this is the predominant 
mechanism of government support for research. In this case the prize is the 
government imposed monopoly that allows the holder of a patent, copyright, or 
other claim exclusivity and to charge prices in excess of the free market price for 
the duration of the monopoly.16
As a practical matter, most countries have used some mix of these four 
mechanisms, with the relative weight depending on the specific area. In recent 
years, there has been a general interest in decentralised prize financing. Faced 
with fiscal constraints, government research budgets have been cut (at least as a 
percentage of GDP). Most countries - often as a result of trade agreements - have 
enriched these prizes by making patents, copyrights, and other monopoly grants 
longer and stronger. Another trend has been (at least an attempt) to reduce 
government’s flexibility in setting rules, for example by requiring that the same 
patent term apply for all sectors and by limiting the ability of governments to limit 
patent monopolies through compulsory licensing.17
The next section outlines some of the benefits and drawbacks of each of these 
methods of financing.
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2.1 Benefits and drawbacks of 
financing mechanisms
Direct financing—centralised system
There is widespread agreement over the need for some amount of direct 
centralised financing for scientific research, although there are major 
disagreements over precisely the role that such funding should play. The 
consensus is that government needs to finance basic research that is not likely 
to yield commercial benefits in the immediate future. Few firms are willing to 
undertake basic research where the prospective return is not only uncertain, but 
often not even well-defined. For example, while the commercial benefits from the 
Internet are now quite evident, this was hardly the case in the 1960s and 1970s 
when the United States Department of Defense was financing the research that 
led to its creation. Similarly, much of the basic biomedical research financed by 
the National Institutes of Health has no immediate commercial use, even if follow 
on innovations may prove to be quite profitable if subject to patent protection. If 
these types of basic research were not supported through some mechanism of 
direct financing, the research would mostly not be done. The risks would be far 
too great to support large investments through a prize mechanism.18 Moreover, 
as Mazzucato (2014) has shown, many privately successful ventures have been 
dependent on government funded innovation for their successes.
While the merits of direct financing through a centralised system for basic 
research are widely accepted, this is much less the case for research focused on 
developing end products such as prescription drugs or medical equipment. The 
argument against this sort of financing is that a centralised mechanism is likely 
to be overly bureaucratic, slow-moving in response to changes in technology 
or changes in needs, and subject to political interference. This raises the risk 
that government financing could end up being largely wasted, with favoured 
companies or individuals being perpetually funded for work that ends up being of 
little value. The same issues exist with funding for basic research; however, in the 
case of basic research there is no feasible alternative. Therefore, these problems, 
insofar as they arise, are an inevitable cost. In practice, the peer review system 
used by, for instance, the National Science Foundation in the US, has proven itself 
to be free of these problems. Similarly, DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency), widely credited with creating the Internet, has proven itself as 
effective sponsor of advanced research.19
There are also many clear benefits from direct funding through a centralised 
mechanism. First and foremost, the output from this research can be made 
freely available. This applies to both the final product (when the research yields 
a marketable product) as well as to the research results. In the case of the 
final product, since the research has been paid for upfront, there is no reason 
that product should not be sold at its free market price, without any sort of 
monopoly protection.20 This would make a dramatic difference in the price of 
many products, most notably prescription drugs. Instead of new drugs selling for 
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tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars per patient, these drugs would be 
available as generics and likely sold at far lower prices. There would be a similar 
situation with many types of medical equipment that often sell for prices that are 
hugely out of line with production costs, due to patent monopolies. By paying for 
research upfront, the problem of making drugs and modern medical equipment 
accessible to the world’s poor would become far more manageable. 
In addition to making the end products available at its free market price (at the 
marginal cost of production), the openness associated with directly financed 
research and testing is also an enormous benefit. This is very clear in the case of 
prescription drugs and medical equipment where there can be serious problems 
of asymmetric information. The pharmaceutical company or equipment 
manufacturer is likely to have far more knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks 
of their product than the doctor who is trying to determine the best treatment 
for a patient. However, if all the test results pertaining to the effectiveness of a 
drug or the usefulness of medical equipment were in the public domain, then 
doctors would be much better situated to make informed decisions. For example, 
if a particular drug had been shown to be more effective for men than women, 
this would be important information for a doctor to have when deciding on the 
best drug to prescribe for a patient. Similarly, for information concerning possible 
side-effects.  
Even if research is not publicly funded, an argument can be made for public 
testing. Testing is an important part of what is normally viewed as the research 
process for drugs with costs that are a significant fraction of the overall costs of 
drug development. Current arrangements, whereby the drug companies develop 
and test the drugs, is expensive and creates an inherent conflict of interest 
- one which has played out disastrously in a number of cases. Testing can be 
separated both from drug development and from marketing. In this regard, see 
the proposals made by, among others, Baker (2008), Jayadev and Stigitz (2010)  
  
The openness of research findings should also hasten the process of research 
itself. Research advances most rapidly in an open environment (Williams, 2010). 
Researchers can build off the findings of fellow researchers and not repeat their 
mistakes. The most important input to most research is knowledge, and the 
patent system restricts access to,21 and especially the use of, previously patented 
knowledge. The constraints on the free flow of knowledge are particularly 
important in the case of basic research, ideas that may have a wide range of 
applications, providing a further rationale for government support for this kind of 
research.  
The US recently conducted an unplanned experiment in the costs and benefits of 
patents. The Supreme Court ruled that one could not patent naturally occurring 
genes. This struck down an important patent on the 2 BRAC genes, the presence 
of which significantly increases the probability of breast cancer. The result was a 
burst of follow-on research which had been stifled, resulting in better tests for the 
presence of the gene, with more accuracy and at a much lower price.
Patents can also be an especially important impediment to the advancement 
of science and technology in areas like hi-tech where a single product may be 
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covered by dozens of patents (unlike a pharmaceutical product, where the patent 
may cover only a particular molecule).22
In addition, the incentives offered in a centralised system can be more closely 
aligned with social goals. This is also true for the prize system to be discussed 
below. Currently, in a decentralised patent system, companies have an incentive 
to carry on deliberately duplicative research in the hope of getting a portion 
of the patent rents earned by a competitor.23 In the case of prescription drugs, 
having multiple treatments for a specific condition can be desirable, since it will 
add pressure to bring down the prices. In addition, alternative treatments will 
almost invariably be better for at least some patients. Nonetheless, the efficient 
allocation of research spending typically entails trying to develop treatments for 
conditions where no effective treatment currently exists, rather than developing 
the second, third, or fourth treatment for a condition when the first one is already 
highly effective.  
While the public centralised provision has a number of distinct advantages, 
there are drawbacks. The money has to be raised somehow, and tax systems 
are distortionary (but not as distortionary as the patent system, which effectively 
raises revenues to finance research through monopoly pricing). The government 
has to select among a large number of research projects, and it may not have the 
information or the incentives to do this well - though the high returns on public 
research and the many successes suggest a credible track record. Still, there is a 
concern that public agencies may suffer from short-term biases similar to those 
confronting the private sector, since politicians want to demonstrate to taxpayers 
the productivity of their investments in technology and science.
If a centralised open system is designed effectively, it can preserve a major 
role for competition in the provision of research, for example by having long-term 
contracts that are subject to renewal. In this situation, companies would have 
a strong incentive to ensure that their spending was productive. This sort of 
system would also maximise incentives for disclosure of research findings.24 A 
contractor would be able to make the case for the value of its research if one of 
its discoveries turned out to provide the basis for an important drug developed 
by a competitor. Rather than trying to hide results from competitors, this sort of 
system would encourage researchers to circulate them as widely as possible.
Most countries have also had a role for direct centralised funding in the arts and 
humanities. This typically takes the form of agencies that fund art, music, movies 
and other forms of culture that are considered socially valuable. The role for 
these agencies has varied enormously across countries and through time. For 
example, the British Broadcasting Service has long been a major source of news 
and cultural material in the United Kingdom, although its role has been shrinking 
in the last four decades. By contrast, the public agencies supporting cultural 
material in the United States support a considerably smaller share of cultural 
production.  
Experiences across a range of countries suggest that, as in other spheres, 
creating ’good‘ institutions is neither easy nor automatic; but there are many 
instances of success, which need to be studied as role models.  
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A substantial amount of research and creative work is directly supported through 
tax credit systems. In the United States, the main tax credit for research spending 
is the research and development (R&D) tax credit, which refunds 14-20 percent of 
R&D spending in excess of the prior years’ spending. (As we noted, it is a credit 
on incremental spending, so as to maximise the incentive to increase spending 
per dollar of lost tax revenue. In recent years, the tax expenditure has averaged 
$18 billion a year or 0.1 percent of GDP.25 
The charitable contribution tax credit can also provide a source of support for 
spending on innovation and creative work. There is a long history of charitable 
foundations supporting research in treating a wide range of diseases. For 
example, the March of Dimes supported Joseph Salk’s work leading to the 
development of the first effective polio vaccine. The Gates Foundation, along 
with several other charitable foundations, has committed funding to develop 
treatments for a wide variety of diseases. 
Charitable foundations in the United States have also played a major role in 
promoting cultural work in a wide variety of areas. Art museums, symphony 
orchestras, and dance companies are often organised as non-profit organisations 
that rely on tax-deductible contributions to a large extent.
There are many potential advantages to direct financing through a decentralised 
system, compared to funding that comes through a government agency or 
agencies. The most important is that no government bureaucracy has to make 
the decisions about how to allocate research spending. These decisions are 
made in a decentralised manner. The tax expenditures effectively lower the 
cost of R & D to the party making the decision. A decentralised system can also 
often respond more quickly to market conditions and technological advances. If 
a company perceives an unmet need or an opening created by a technological 
advance, it doesn’t have to wait to get a contract from a government agency. It 
can immediately act to take advantage of the perceived opportunity. Still, if the 
tax subsidy is not large enough, or not well structured, there may remain large 
gaps between private and social returns to research.   
The structure of a tax credit system also gives companies incentives not to 
engage in wasteful research. While the tax credit may subsidise the research, if it 
does not result in a useful product, the company will still have wasted the portion 
of the spending that it financed itself. 
It is also worth noting that the tax credit system in the United States does not in 
any way preclude companies from taking full advantage of patent monopolies. In 
this situation companies are relying on both direct government support through 
the tax credit system and patent prize support.    
2.2 Direct financing – 
decentralised system
17
The decentralised system of direct financing could be especially appropriate 
for creative work. A major problem with direct centralised funding is that it can 
effectively give the government a large voice in determining what sort of creative 
and cultural work gets supported. While firewalls can limit the extent to which 
narrow political considerations affect the type of work that gets supported, it 
is impossible to completely insulate public agencies from political influence. In 
addition, there is a legitimate concern that a centralised agency may be less open 
to supporting the most innovative work and new artists.
A decentralised system gets around this problem. As currently structured, 
the tax deduction system in the United States, for example is heavily skewed 
towards upper income individuals. The subsidy comes in the form of a deduction 
against taxable income. This means that those in higher tax brackets effectively 
get larger subsidies for their contributions. Most low and moderate income 
households don’t have any income tax liability, which means that they could not 
even in principle benefit from the deduction since it is not refundable. However, it 
is possible to structure a subsidy through the tax system that is less regressive. 
For example, it would be possible to allocate a certain sum (e.g. $100 in the 
United States) to each adult to be used to support whatever creative workers 
the person chooses. This payment could also pass through intermediaries who 
support a type or types of creative work.  A move from a charitable tax deduction 
to a charitable tax credit would at least provide equal marginal incentives for 
charitable contributions for the rich and the middle class; it would not bias social 
spending towards the preferences of the rich. 
 
This route could allow for a substantial flow of money to support creative 
work that could then be freely distributed without the protection of copyright 
monopolies. In contrast to the copyright system, which is threatened by digital 
technology and the Internet, this sort of system would allow take full advantage 
of new technology to allow a vast amount of creative work to be available at 
essentially zero cost. Since creative workers have already been paid through the 
tax credit system, they have been compensated for their work.
This system could also operate in competition with the current copyright system, 
with creative workers opting for the system of their choice.26 In this case, people 
would be able to both purchase items subject to copyright protection, while 
getting any material produced through the tax credit system at zero cost. The 
market would then determine whether one or both systems survived.
18
2.3 Patent prize financing – 
centralised system
This mechanism preserves most of the structure of a decentralised patent prize 
system with the exception that the government would buy up some or all patents 
and place them in the public domain.27 This has generally been proposed as a 
mechanism for supporting research and development for prescription drugs, 
although in principle it could be applied in other areas as well (see, among others, 
Jayadev and Stiglitz, 2010, Baker 2009, Stiglitz 2006, Kremer 1998). 
The major advantage of a centralised patent prize system is that it allows the 
innovation to be used at its marginal cost after the buyout. Also, a condition 
of getting the prize money the patent holder could be required to disclose all 
relevant research findings, although such a requirement can be problematic, as 
discussed below.28
A buyout system can be either mandatory or voluntary. In the latter case, the 
prize would have to be equal to or greater than the expected (risk adjusted) value 
of the future profits from being allowed to maintain a monopoly in the market 
for the duration of the patent.29 Even if it patent holders are required to accept a 
buyout, all drug patents are not necessarily purchased by the government. The 
government could buy up patents of what it determines to be the most important 
drugs and allow other drugs to maintain their patent monopolies. This pattern 
of selective purchasing could both ensure that the most important drugs are 
available at prices near their cost of production, while also putting pressure on 
the prices of the drugs that are not purchased, to drop. This would especially 
be true for the drugs in direct competition with drugs where the patents have 
been bought. It would be difficult to charge a very high price for a drug when a 
comparable or even superior drug is available at generic prices.
By bringing prices down to their competitive level, in cases where patents are 
actually purchased, or close to that level in other cases, the centralised prize 
system would end many of the abuses associated with patent monopolies. 
Most immediately, the lower price would eliminate most of the deadweight loss 
caused by monopoly pricing.30 It should also reduce or eliminate the incentive 
for drug companies to mislead doctors and researchers about the safety and 
effectiveness of their products. Furthermore, if all clinical test results were 
publicly disclosed, there would be no possibility of misrepresentations. This 
system should also substantially reduce the incentive for undesirable duplicative 
research. There would be little point in developing subsequent drugs in instances 
where a highly effective drug already existed to treat a particular condition. 
There are also some aspects of this sort of prize system that would be 
problematic. First, deciding the size of the prize is likely to be a contentious issue. 
One route would be to base the payment on a measure of the drugs benefits to 
the population similar to the quality adjusted life years (QALY) used to determine 
drug pricing in many countries.31 Using QALY as a measure of the public health 
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impact for determining the price of the prize has been made in different for a, 
for example by the Health Impact Fund (HIF) and in Jayadev and Stiglitz 2010. 
This route provides a basis for determining prices, even if it will inevitably be 
somewhat imprecise. Another possibility is to assign a price through an auction 
system, with the buyout price being determined by the prices bid in auctions in 
which the government exercises its right to buy the patent (Kremer, 1998). 
  
This method makes the purchase of the patent an all or nothing proposition. It 
means that researchers who may have made substantial breakthroughs, but not 
actually gotten the key patent, will receive nothing for their efforts. Apart from 
issues of fairness, this situation strongly encourages secrecy in research—just 
as the patent system does.32 In this respect, a patent buyout system would be a 
little different from the current system in terms of sharing research results. This 
is also likely to lead to unnecessary duplication in the research process where 
teams of researchers repeat each other’s mistakes and fail to benefit from their 
successes, because these are not publicly known until after a buyout takes place 
(or, more generally, until after the prize is awarded. But with one research project 
leading to the next, secrecy may still prevail, because of the prospect the prior 
undisclosed research will provide a leg up in the next ‘contest’).   
The prize system can be combined with public direct support, especially in the 
case of drugs. Jayadev and Stiglitz (2010) and Baker (2008) argue for public 
testing as noted above. This would eliminate the perversity of the current 
arrangement, where the owner of the drug tests it and has an incentive to ensure 
that the drug performs well. Turning over responsibility for testing (which often 
comprises a large fraction of the entire costs, and does not entail the kind of 
creativity associated with the development of a new product) to a public agency 
would thus make the system less expensive (since often drug companies 
effectively integrate testing and marketing) and more accurate. The acquisition 
of the drug could occur before or after testing.33   
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2.4 Patent prize financing – 
decentralised system
This system allows companies to recoup their research costs by monopoly pricing 
for the duration of the patent. The net effect of the patent system on innovation is 
a subject of some controversy. The incentive to become the monopolist provides 
an incentive for research spending. At the same time, the patent system, as we 
have noted, both adds to and reduces the pool of knowledge that others can draw 
upon. Moreover, a monopoly, once established, may have reduced incentives to 
invest in R & D. Further, incentives are distorted, simply because there are large 
disparities between social and private returns, e.g. the social return is only the 
benefit of having the innovation earlier than it otherwise would have occurred. 
There are other distortions in incentives - encouraging research that enhances 
market power or enables the seizing of rents from others. The problems are 
largest, or at least most apparent, in the case of prescription drugs, both because 
spending in this area is large relative to the size of the economy (more than 2.0 
percent of GDP in many countries) and also because access to drugs are a matter 
of life and health. 
(The patent system can be viewed as a form of government sponsored research, 
with the difference between the price and the marginal cost a “tax,” the proceeds 
of which are given to the owner of the patent. The government effectively 
delegates the right to levy the tax and appropriate the proceeds to the patent 
owner. Viewed in this light, these patent revenues represent for most countries 
the largest spending on research.34)
Most immediately, the large gap between price and marginal cost gives 
pharmaceutical companies an enormous incentive to sell their product even 
when it may not be the best treatment for patients. This can mean concealing 
evidence that a drug is less effective than claimed or that it could be harmful for 
some patients. 
The large disparity between price and marginal costs also leads to large amounts 
of resources being devoted to marketing. Practices like direct to consumer 
advertising or side-payments (sometimes including outright kickbacks) raise the 
risk of leading not to the best medical outcomes for patients.35 
This situation is made worse by the fact that there is inevitably a serious problem 
of asymmetric information, with the pharmaceutical companies knowing much 
more about the safety and effectiveness of their drugs than the doctors who 
prescribe them. In a context of monopoly pricing, the pharmaceutical industry 
has enormous incentive to exploit these asymmetries. 
The fact that third party payers, either insurers or governments, finance most 
pharmaceutical spending adds another channel for waste and corruption with 
patent financed research in the sector. The industry’s efforts are often focused 
on finding ways to force these third parties to pay as much as possible for their 
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drugs. As a result, large amounts of resources are devoted to legal fees and 
lobbying expenses. The latter often involves having industry funded disease 
groups (patients suffering from a particular disease, along with family members 
and friends) lobbying to increase the use and/or payments for its drugs.
Patent supported research also creates incentives for wasteful research in the 
form of duplicative drugs. There can be large rents associated with developing a 
second, third, or fourth drug for a specific condition when a breakthrough drug is 
earning large patent rents. As noted, these drugs will typically have some value, 
but in most cases research funding would be better spent on seeking cures for 
conditions where effective treatments do not currently exist.
Patent supported research also creates incentives for secrecy in the research 
process. A company in search of patents will disclose only the minimum 
information necessary to secure a patent and to gain approval for its drugs. It has 
no incentive to share information with potential competitors. In addition, patent 
support also has the effect of pushing research in the direction of patentable 
products. Companies have no incentive to pursue evidence suggesting 
that a particular condition could be best treated with diet or exercise or that 
environmental factors may be a cause of bad health. While they may make this 
information public for others to pursue, they have no direct incentive to do so.
Similar issues with patent supported research arise in other sectors as well, but 
they generally will not be as serious as with prescription drugs, since the patent 
rents are a much smaller share of the price of the final product. Nonetheless, the 
pursuit of patent rents can still lead to substantial waste and be an impediment 
to innovation.
Patents can often be used as a form of harassment of competitors, even if 
there may be little substance to claims of infringement. The lawsuits between 
Samsung and Apple over each other’s new smartphones were a major aspect 
of their competition for several years. Patent trolls routinely file suits against 
successful companies, with the hope of getting far enough to get a substantial 
settlement even if the underlying claim is dubious. To avoid these sorts of legal 
issues there is evidence that smaller firms and start-ups divert their research 
to areas without many competitors since they lack the legal resources to fight 
lengthy patent battles in court (Lerner, 1995).
In addition, patents can increase the cost of research. Research tools, such as 
software programs and various biological entities, are often subject to patent 
protection, which substantially raises their cost. As a result, patent protection can 
impede research by making the process more expensive.
Finally, the system itself is expensive. It is costly to maintain a cadre of qualified 
patent examiners who have the time and expertise to assess the merits of a 
patent application and ensure that the new patent is not infringing on prior 
patents. But these public expenses are but a fraction of the total expenses, e.g. 
associated with the cadre of lawyers engaged in filing patents, suing for patent 
infringement, and defending patents. The legal disputes between patent holders 
and alleged infringers can often be quite complicated involving complex issues 
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requiring expertise in narrow areas. This was the rationale for the United States 
setting up a special appellate court to deal with patent disputes.  Some claim that 
in the United States more is spent on the legal system associated with the patent 
system than on the underlying research itself. 
While the inefficiencies associated with the potentially large gap between price 
and marginal cost as a result of the exercise of monopoly power are significant, 
those associated with copyright monopolies may be even larger, since they can 
make items costly that would otherwise be available at essentially a zero price on 
the Internet.36
The effort to protect copyrights has often led to delays in the introduction of 
new hardware and software, until the affected industries were convinced that 
adequate precautions were in place to limit the unauthorised reproduction of 
copyright protected work. The effort to afford inadvertent infringement can impose 
a considerable cost on creative workers. For example, someone producing a 
movie based on past events may have to go to considerable lengths to determine 
the copyright status of a picture or song segment used in the movie. This is 
especially expensive in the United States where there is no registry of copyrights.
As a result of recent changes in the law in the United States (similar provisions 
are also in many trade agreements) copyright holders can impose costs on third 
parties. Current law requires Internet intermediaries to remove material upon 
notice for which there is a claim of copyright violation, in order to escape potential 
liability. This effectively requires an intermediary like Facebook or Verizon to side 
with the party claiming copyright against their own customer. There have been 
efforts to strengthen these laws to require intermediaries to act pre-emptively to 
find and remove copyright protected material.
Copyright also obstructs the development of derivative works. For example, 
writers cannot produce work based on the character of Harry Potter without 
permission of the copyright holder. The same would be true of a producer who 
wanted to make a film that took up the characters and/or theme of a movie. 
Rules and design
This discussion has given short shrift to the many details of patent and copyright 
law. Details matter - as evidenced by the efforts of lobbyists to change IPR 
provisions, sometimes in seemingly small ways to enhance profits. Whatever 
their rhetoric and arguments, they are not concerned with increasing the pace of 
innovation; they are simply concerned with maximising their profits. Among the 
egregious examples was the retroactive extension of the life of copyright until 70 
years after the death of the author (and later to 95 years) - a provision dubbed 
the “Mickey Mouse” provision, since a main beneficiary was Disney, which would 
be able to appropriate rents from Mickey Mouse for more years. No evidence 
was presented that writers would be more creative - or that there would be more 
writers - as a result of this extension of copyright; but there is evidence that it 
has impeded the publication of scholarly works analysing writers such as James 
Joyce.
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Not surprisingly, it is hard to marshal empirical evidence as to whether say 
a change in the life or breadth of a patent will lead to more research. We have 
presented arguments that could go either way, e.g. since patents may reduce 
the pool of available knowledge that others may draw upon, and magnitude of 
this pool of knowledge is at least as or more important than the relatively small 
changes in marginal incentives, strengthening patent protection may reduce the 
flow of innovation.37 
Indeed, there are some who suggest that the marginal cost of any patent 
protection exceeds the marginal benefit, at least in many industries. The earlier 
analysis which said that without patent protection firms would have no way 
of appropriating returns to innovative activity oversimplified the issue in many 
critical ways. The first mover - the inventor of a new product - has distinct 
advantages over successors. He can move down the learning curve, producing 
at a lower cost or refining the product in ways that make it more attractive to 
customers. Though there may be instances of ‘leapfrogging’, where a new entrant 
leapfrogs the first entrant, these are rare, and noteworthy because they happen 
so seldom. In some industries, the costs of patenting (including that associated 
with the disclosure requirements, which provides valuable information to rivals) 
exceed the benefits. These industries rely on trade secrets. (Dosi and Stiglitz, 
201438 )
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2.5 Combining the systems of support
As noted, these alternative mechanisms for supporting innovation and creative 
work can and are used in conjunction with each other, although the interactions 
often are not carefully considered. For example, there is much direct public 
funding of both research and creative work, however the beneficiaries of this 
funding are typically allowed to get patent and copyright monopolies with few 
restrictions. Beneficiaries of tax credits and the charitable contribution deduction 
also typically can get patent and copyright monopolies in the same manner as 
someone who had not received this support. There is concern that allowing 
universities to patent the product of their research may undermine the open 
architecture which many believe is a key part of universities and key to their 
success in innovation.
It is certainly possible to combine these mechanisms in ways that maximise their 
social benefit. For example, direct public funding could come with conditions on 
the openness of research and also limits on the extent of monopolies, either by 
reducing the duration or requiring open licensing. The openness requirement for 
all stages of research would be particularly valuable in the case of clinical trials 
of prescription drugs since it would provide enormously valuable information 
to doctors in prescribing decisions and eliminate the worst forms of abuses in 
marketing drugs.
Similarly, it would be reasonable to put restrictions on tax credit recipients so that 
their patents were of shorter duration or required open licensing. If the tax credits 
were sufficiently generous to be a substitute for patent support (this would be 
more likely for sectors other than prescription drugs) it would be possible to 
make recipients ineligible for patents altogether. It also would be possible to 
have openness requirements for research results from tax credit supported work. 
If this route is offered as an alternative to patent supported funding, then the 
willingness of companies to opt for the tax credit will depend on whether they 
perceive the risk-adjusted return to be better under the tax credit system.39
The dynamics of having different types of systems in direct competition could 
provide a direct market test of their relative merits. In principle, there will likely 
be reasons why it will always be desirable to have a mix of mechanisms, but 
their relative weight may vary both through time and depending on the specifics 
issues in a given sector. The key point is that the mix of mechanisms should be 
determined by deliberate policy. It often appears to be ad hoc at present.
A short aside
Having noted these four alternatives, of course there is a whole other mechanism: 
committing and promoting knowledge commons and open access as a principle. 
This kind of issue is probably more important and feasible for some industries 
and areas of intellectual advance than others. For example, it is possible 
that providing support for open content licensing as a strategy for developing 
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countries may provide a greater leeway to stretch education budgets. It may 
be less feasible to develop such mechanisms for pharmaceutical advances, 
by contrast, though even here there may be more creative ways to address the 
issues of static vs. dynamic efficiency. (We will address some of these in section 
5 for some industries.)
The open access and open knowledge movements and their associated 
approaches have multiple advantages over the current system. They have 
simple and meaningful rules that prevent some of the more egregious abuses 
that currently exist. Thus, for example, there are clear norms to facilitate 
attribution of effort, which is often the most important motivation for authors. 
By starting with the notion that, to the extent possible, access to knowledge for 
all is to be achieved, and that knowledge is best seen as something that should 
fundamentally remain in the public domain, these movements have provided a 
set of valuable legal and institutional frames that could be more widely used in 
promoting meaningful innovation. Examples include, creative commons licenses, 
open access journals, cumulative collaboration, peer to peer networks, among 
others. While still relatively new, these movements promise the possibility of a 
more rational framework to maximise the use and generation of innovation, at 
least in some key areas. An adequate and comprehensive presentation of the 
possibilities present in such a framing is beyond the purview of this paper, but 
interested readers can look at Krikorian and Kapczynski (2010) for a useful 
overview.
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We have, thus far focused on how innovation may be better protected and 
incentivised in general. The IP regime as we noted in the introduction does not 
work very effectively in both developed and developing countries. In the former, 
several pathologies, such as the problems associated with patent thickets, patent 
trolls and evergreening are well documented. High tech companies are often 
confronted with being unable to innovate without violating other companies’ 
intellectual property rights since innovation often requires the use of currently 
existing IP. This leads to blocks (sometimes called a patent thicket), that delays 
and reduced IP because of the long and costly negotiations involved in obtaining 
the multiple permissions needed. Patent trolling, whereby innovators face suit 
from others who simply own IP to profit by licensing of litigation rather than 
undertaking production themselves is well known with particularly egregious 
cases. Estimates suggest that this cost the US roughly $30 billion a year (Bessen 
and Meurer, 2014). Similarly, the process of evergreening, whereby companies 
extend their patent protection by inventing new follow-on patents that are closely 
linked but which allow for a longer period of monopoly than would otherwise 
be permitted, is an important impediment to competition, especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
3. Intellectual Property Rights 
and Developing Countries
The process of evergreening, whereby companies 
extend their patent protection by inventing new follow-
on patents that are closely linked but which allow for 
a longer period of monopoly than would otherwise be 
permitted, is an important impediment to competition, 
especially in the pharmaceutical industry.
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Our focus in this section is on the impact of the current IP regime on global 
development.
Developing economies are, almost by definition, significantly distant from the 
global innovation and production frontier. While individual industries and firms 
can often be close to the frontier, the generalised adoption of latest generation 
technologies and the garnering of the positive externalities that often result from 
these is a key feature of advanced industrialised economies. What separates 
developing from developed countries is as much a gap in knowledge as a gap in 
resources. 
The artificial scarcity created by IPR generates economic inefficiencies. One 
person’s access to knowledge does not detract from another’s. One country’s 
use of a new technology does not compromise the ability of the rest of the world 
to benefit from it. The temporary monopoly conferred by IPR creates a market 
distortion, resulting in less access than is socially optimal. At a time when 
learning is increasingly recognised as foundational to development, we should be 
sceptical of institutions that remove knowledge from the common pool without a 
clear justification (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014).
From a development perspective, it is therefore necessary to evaluate whether 
IPR remains fit for the purpose, in the sense that it results in greater overall 
production of knowledge and the advancement of standards of living than would 
be achieved without it. There is an extensive literature that attempts to answer 
these questions. The evidence is uncertain at best and there are alternative 
mechanisms to protect intellectual effort, as noted before. In any case, from a 
development perspective, the inquiry must go further than this.
First, the developing country needs to ask, what IPR (or more broadly, innovation 
system) best advances its own standard of living. Stronger IPR may constitute 
a barrier to the ability of its firms catching up to the frontier, even if it enhances 
innovation within the country. Because developing countries are engaged in 
catching up, the optimal IPR regime for them will in general differ from that for a 
more advanced economy. 
Moreover, stronger IPR regimes will entail the transfer of more money in the form 
of royalty payments from developing to developed countries. The benefits to 
developing countries from these increased payments (beyond the direct transfer 
of knowledge) are minimal, i.e. it is not likely that these payments will significantly 
affect either the amount or direction of research. This is most apparent in the 
drug industry, where pharmaceutical company devote relatively little of their 
research budget towards the diseases that afflict developing countries, and the 
incremental returns that they receive from developing countries are sufficiently 
smaller that they are unlikely to affect significantly the overall pace of innovation.
In addition to examining the impact of IPR on the extent of innovation, it is 
also important to consider the direction of innovation. Do current frameworks 
encourage innovators to address the most pressing issues facing our global 
society and developing countries’ needs? Do they ensure access to the products 
of this innovation by those who need it most? And so on. 
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At least since Solow’s early quantification (Solow, 1958) economists have recognised 
that the most important determinant of growth, and thereby development and 
welfare is technological change and the knowledge embodied in that technology. 
For developing countries, the most important determinant of growth is the pace 
of closing the knowledge gap. Furthermore, knowledge is a good that is inherently 
non-rival. A very simple but powerful result follows from this. To maximise global social welfare, policy makers should strongly encourage global knowledge diffusion from developed to developing countries when similar technology is appropriate for both types of countries. Such an understanding would suggest that a global social 
welfare maximiser would minimise impediments to knowledge transfer, including 
abolishing intellectual property restrictions that hamper such transfers especially 
when the knowledge has already been produced. 
The movement towards the strengthening of IPRs in developing countries is, 
therefore, to a first approximation, only a distributive issue, with industrial country 
firms obtaining IP rents at the expense of developing economy consumers and 
reducing market competition. This fact has of course, been long recognised (for 
example, see, Rodrik 1994).
By contrast the prevailing policy vision, pushed often by the US government and 
others, is that developing countries need to increase the level and stringency 
of the existing intellectual property provisions for two linked reasons. First, if 
developing countries are to expect international transfers of technology they need 
to compensate multinational firms. Second, increasing the level of intellectual 
property protection, it is argued, will spur the development of innovative 
domestic firms that have thus far been hampered from investing in research and 
development capacity because their efforts would be freely appropriated.
The first argument rests squarely on the notion that the provision of technology 
transfer through investment by MNEs from advanced countries increases the 
pace by which the knowledge gap is closed, because of the otherwise limited 
absorptive capacity on the part of the developing country. According to the 
‘absorptive capacity’ argument, stronger IPRs stimulate diffusion by providing 
a secure channel for multinational companies to share their know-how. In 
the absence of this, countries simply do not have the domestic capacity even 
to imitate these technologies. IPRs therefore act as essential midwives for 
technology diffusion. At the same time, it is assumed that with weak IPRs the 
country’s ability to absorb the technology is so high that the knowledge will be 
effectively stolen. But, putting aside the seeming contradictory positions on the 
country’s ability to absorb knowledge - it can only do so when the production 
occurs within the country - as a theoretical proposition this argument is dubious. 
To maximise global social welfare, policy makers 
should strongly encourage global knowledge diffusion 
from developed to developing countries when similar 
technology is appropriate for both types of countries.
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After all, IP will be protected in other countries even if a particular developing 
country does not have strong protection. This means that the only risk a potential 
investor faces from investing in a country with weak protections is the use of 
the knowledge in that country. This could be an important issue in some large 
countries with potentially lucrative internal markets, but it’s hard to see that as a 
great risk to potential investors in most developing countries.
Despite this rhetoric, however, there is very little evidence that IPRs are important 
among the factors that influence the international transfer of technology. Cross-
country evidence for this is, at best mixed. (For a comprehensive, if somewhat 
dated review, see Maskus (2004).) Moreover, the literature on FDI has consistently 
found that factors such as market size, infrastructure and effective governance 
(in the form of better business regulation) have been much more important in 
determining flows of investment and therein, flows of information and know-how.
Moreover, country case studies again show very little evidence of IPRs being 
important for technology transfer in any real historical context. Certainly, in the 
period of early industrialisation, laws provided very little protection for global 
intellectual property (as opposed to domestic IP). By the standards of today’s 
global rules, every advanced industrialised country would have been classified 
as an intellectual property violator at the early stages of development when they 
freely used ideas and technologies generated elsewhere. As Ha Joon Chang 
(Chang, 2002) notes with regard to the European and American experience, “laws 
accorded only very inadequate protection of the IPRs of foreign …. For example, many of patent laws were very lax on checking the originality of the invention. More importantly, in most countries, including Britain (before the 1852 reform), the Netherlands, Austria, and France, patenting of imported invention by their nationals was often explicitly allowed.”
The more recent experience of Japan, Korea, and even more recently China, also 
provides strong evidence against the view that stringent IPRs are necessary for 
the inflow of foreign investment, domestic technological development and the 
transfer of technology. Indeed, as Maskus (2004) and others have argued, Korea 
and Japan made explicit use of weak enforcement of IPRs and an extensive use 
of ‘creative imitation’ to promote a whole range of frontier technology industries. 
Similarly, weak IPRs have allowed China to develop a range of frontier technology 
firms and industries, ranging from cell phones (Xiaomi) or Solar Cell Technology.
By the standards of today’s global rules, every 
advanced industrialised country would have been 
classified as an intellectual property violator at the 
early stages of development when they freely used 
ideas and technologies generated elsewhere. 
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Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the substantial absorptive capacity 
in developing countries is that of pharmaceutical products in India. As is well-
known, the Indian pharmaceutical industry that sprung up in the aftermath of 
Indira Gandhi’s decision to ban pharmaceutical patents has developed to become 
perhaps one of the most important generic pharmaceutical industries in the 
world.  For most drugs, the industry has been able to provide the generic molecule 
in India quicker than the original manufacturer and for a substantially cheaper 
price. Table (1), drawn from Jayadev and Park, 2011 considers the twenty top 
selling drugs in the US in 2006. Among the top 20 selling drugs in the United 
States, every molecule had a generic producer in India. However, for only 6 of 
these 20 cases did the patent owner market a brand in India and in only 2 of these 
20 was the patent owner the first to bring the drug to the Indian market. Most 
patent owners had production units in India but the majority chose not to launch 
their products in the country immediately. While this is not prima facie evidence 
to suggest that new drugs would not have been marketed in India except for the 
existence of generic firms, it is certainly reason to question whether multinational 
corporations would have an incentive to invest in the country, given its relatively 
small size of market for drugs selling at prices prevailing under patent protection.
Entry into the Indian Market of Top 20 Brand Name Drugs
Brand*
(Molecule)
No.
Lipitor(Atorvastatin)
[Cholesterol]
Nexium(Esomeprazole)
[Gastroesophageal 
Reflux]
Prevacid (Lansoprazole) 
[Gastroesophageal 
Reflux]
1.
2.
3.
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Pfizer
(United States)
AstraZeneca  
(United Kingdom)
Novartis 
(Switzerland)
Patent Owner Brand 
Available 
in India?
Molecule 
available in 
India?**
Was the molecule 
launched by the 
patent owner in 
India?
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Advair  Diskus(Fluticasone Propionate)
[Asthma]
Singulair(Montelukast Sodium)
Effexor XR(Venlafaxine HCL)
Plavix(Clopidrogel)
[Coronary Artery 
Disease]
Zocor(Simvastatin)
[Cholesterol]
Norvasc(Amlodipine Besylate)
[Angina]
Lexapro(Escitalopram Oxalate)
[Depression]
Seroquel(Quetiapine Fumarate)
[Schizophrenia]
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Glaxo Smith 
Kline 
(United Kingdom)
Merck 
(Germany)
Wyeth 
(United States)
Sanofi-Aventis 
(France)
Merck 
(Germany)
Pfizer
(United States)
Lundbeck 
(Denmark)
AstraZeneca
(United Kingdom)
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Protonix(Pantaprazole Sodium)
[Gastroesophageal 
Reflux]
Ambien(Zolpidem Tartarate)
[Insomnia]
Actos(Pioglitazone)
[Diabetes]
Zoloft(Sertraline)
[Depression]
Wellbutrin XL(Bupropion)
[Depression/
Smoking]
Avandia(Rosiglitazone)
[Diabetes]
Risperdal(Risperidone)
[Schizophrenia]
Zyprexa(Olanzapine)
[Schizophrenia]
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Wyeth
(United States)
Sanofi-Aventis 
(France)
Takeda/Eli Lilly
(United States)
Pfizer
(United States)
Glaxo Smith 
Kline 
(United Kingdom)
Glaxo Smith 
Kline
(United Kingdom)
Janssen 
(Belgium)
Janssen 
(Belgium)
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Topamax(Topiramate)
[Epilepsy]
20. N Y NWyeth
(United States)
Source: *Drug Topics 2006, **Mediclik.com, ORG-IMS data.
The absorptive capacity argument is further weakened if one recognises that 
information and capacity are diffused and that it is difficult ex-ante to know 
where productive capacity may spring up. If the policymaker presumes that there 
is little know-how and capacity domestically and therefore puts in stringent IPR in 
order to attract multinational capital in order to facilitate international technology 
transfers, he or she may have the effect of forestalling the development of a 
potentially viable domestic industry that might have succeeded without the IP 
barrier. Certainly, the historical cases of actual knowledge diffusion are ones in 
which rather unexpectedly, industries that may not have been seen as viable or 
obvious ended up becoming key to country development experiences.
Dosi and Stiglitz (2014) observe, that there are host of factors that are have 
historically been part of the process of climbing up the development and knowledge 
ladder. These in turn suggest that the process of knowledge transfer is not likely 
to be achieved in a straightforward manner by simply guaranteeing intellectual 
property rights to multinational corporations. Among the many other factors that 
have been historically important are the free mobility of labour so as to transfer 
embodied knowledge, open source forms of knowledge dissemination, outright 
copying and imitation of pre-existing technologies and formal licensing of 
patented technology, all of which have been severely restricted in the last 20 years.
This experience and these arguments suggest that the weight of policy in 
general should push towards less intellectual property restriction in developing 
countries rather than more as is currently the case. Even this way of putting the 
matter is an oversimplification: there are a myriad of details that constitute an 
IPR regime, and these cannot necessarily be summarised by a single metric, 
‘stronger’ vs. ‘weaker’ (or more accurately more exclusive and less exclusive. 
There is a strong presumption that an IPR regime appropriate for a developing 
country attempting to close the knowledge gap between itself and the advanced 
countries should be different from that for more advanced countries. Certainly, 
in some key industries where knowledge transfer is literally a matter of life and 
death (the classic case being pharmaceuticals), IP protection should be kept at a 
minimum if there is domestic capacity to imitate (as in the example of India). In 
the following sections, we detail how and why the current system of intellectual 
property rights protection are socially sub-optimal in developing countries and 
some ways to remedy them. Though the intellectual property provisions provided 
within the WTO (TRIPS, the trade-related intellectual property system which came 
fully into effect in 2005 - it was called ‘trade related’ in order to stuff it into a trade 
agreement), allows for some variation across countries, there is an excessive 
attempt to impose as US-style IPR regime - a regime which is not even working 
now well for the US. Worse, the US government has put pressure for governments 
not to exercise fully the scope for variation seemingly provided under TRIPS, e.g. 
in the imposition of compulsory licenses.
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The current governing principle for global intellectual property is embodied 
in the TRIPS regime. Given the compelling reasons to be sceptical that more 
stringent IPRs are conducive to more rapid development, it is not easy to argue 
that the TRIPS agreement is oriented towards development. Indeed, that was 
why the developing countries called for a developmentally oriented intellectual property regime. (See Stiglitz, 2004). Rather, as a first cut, TRIPS is a historically 
unprecedented harmonisation of intellectual property rights that allows for more 
IP protection and forces developing countries to make payments for innovations 
and creative work, some of which have already been developed or likely would 
have been developed even without IP protections in the developing world.40 In the 
former case, the purpose is pure rent extraction, since the protected innovation 
or creative work could be transferred at near zero cost without protection. In 
the latter case, the possibility of gaining rents from the developing world can 
have some marginal impact on innovation, but this is likely to be limited, simply 
because developing countries’ expenditures, say on drugs, is such a small 
percentage of total expenditure.41 The main effect may simply be a flow of funds 
from developing countries to develop. 
More critically, while there has been a broad consensus that the world should 
be moving towards a ‘TRIPS-minus’ regime, i.e., less stringent global protection 
of IP (see the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation 
and its 2003 report42) in practice, there has been a movement towards what may 
be termed TRIPS-plus provisions, typically as part of bilateral trade agreements. 
These range from more extensive patents to such back-door anti-competitive 
provisions such as those designed to make it more difficult for generic medicines 
to enter the market (such as data exclusivity) and which make it easier for patent 
holders to ‘evergreen’ their patents to maintain monopolies long after the normal 
20-year term of the patent has gone by.
But the global upward harmonisation is not the only problem in the current global 
regime of intellectual property rights. Other related weaknesses lead to equally 
serious welfare losses.
4. Current Pathologies of the 
International IPR Regime
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First, it is often the case that developing countries, with few exceptions, do not 
have well-working patent systems or may have somewhat lax systems. With the 
adoption of the TRIPS agreement they still have to enforce patents through their 
own legal system. 
This creates serious problems for countries without an active civil society or 
domestic industry body in the area concerned. The party seeking to have a patent 
enforced (typically an advanced country multinational corporation), will typically 
have much more to gain than those seeking to challenge a patent, and are likely 
to have much greater resources to undertake a legal challenge.43 While this is 
a problem in advanced industrialised countries as well, it is likely to be a much 
more serious problem in developing countries where the balance of power may 
be much more skewed between litigants. 
Moreover, there is a serious misalignment of incentives in the patent challenge 
process. Legal proceedings to challenge the validity of patents are costly and 
time- consuming. If a company seeks to overturn a patent, this implies that the 
knowledge embodied in that patent is open to use, including for competitors and 
the cost in terms of money and effort are not appropriable by the patent challenger. 
Of course, there have been suggestions to allow a successful patent challenger 
to be granted an exclusive right, but this merely transfers the monopoly with the 
attendant welfare losses. Thus, there is a public good problem that should, per 
economic theory, lead to an under provisioning of patent challenges, as we noted 
earlier. With TRIPS and with less stringent patent systems, the balance of power 
therefore lies more heavily with the original patent holder, whether or not the 
patent is genuinely innovative. Indeed, high profile cases such as the dismissal of 
a patent on Gleevec (an anti-cancer drug) in India are very much the exception.44 
It is likely that in the absence of the concerted effort by public interest groups 
and developing country competitors that a very large number of weak patents go 
unchallenged, thereby unambiguously lowering global welfare.  
The rules of the patent system matter, here as elsewhere:  some countries have 
adopted provisions which have lowered the costs of opposing patents and 
increased the incentives for doing so. (See Henry and Stiglitz (2010).) Other 
countries have adopted strong patent examination procedures and examination 
guidelines, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, such as the ANVISA prior 
consent mechanism in Brazil and the patentability examination guidelines in 
Argentina. For the former, for example, any patent that is approved by the patent 
office needs to go to the ministry of health and be examined again to see if there 
are any negative implications for access to medicines.
A second set of problems arises with the fact that the particular knowledge 
and technology developed through the patent system in and for the need and 
concerns of wealthy countries may not address the concerns of developing 
countries. This is most obviously the case with diseases that are concentrated 
in the developing world. Drug companies in the wealthy countries will not 
pursue treatments for these diseases under the patent system, unless there is 
some additional incentive, since the potential customers do not have sufficient 
purchasing power to support the research.45 This virtually necessitates some 
additional funding mechanism either from governments, international aid 
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agencies, or private charities. A typical idea is that of the Health Impact Fund, 
that seeks to incentivise research into neglected diseases by creating a global 
fund that aims precisely at those diseases which are not naturally incentivised by 
advanced country markets. (There are alternative ways that have been proposed 
for doing so, e.g. a fund guaranteeing a minimum purchase of the drug or a 
fund providing a prize, in return for opening up the patent. Both reduce the risk 
confronting the innovator. But the former leaves in place the monopoly-prize 
system.)
There are similar issues in other areas. Developing country agriculture may 
not draw much interest from researchers in instances where climate, soil, or 
other factors make crops developed in the wealthy countries unsuitable for the 
developing world.  In the case of both drugs and agriculture, patent protection will 
give companies incentives to promote innovations that may not be appropriate 
for the developing world. For example, drug companies would stand to profit 
from promoting drugs for treating diseases in situations where diet, nutrition, or 
addressing environmental factors may be more important.
In the case of agriculture, seed companies may try to make farmers dependent 
on purchased seed instead of relying on replanting a portion of their own crop. 
These problems arise in wealthy countries as well, but with much greater 
asymmetry in power and access to information in developing countries, the risk 
for such abuses are much greater.
With the wrong legal framework, matters can be even worse: in some countries 
farmers using their own seeds which have been contaminated with the 
genetically modified seed can be sued. Because the country’s farmers cannot 
sell their products as non-GMO, the latter should perhaps have the right to sue the 
seed companies and their neighbours who have used the GMO seed which have 
imposed a negative externality on them.
Finally, but equally important, the current design of the patent system makes 
it difficult, on the one hand, for developing countries to provide protections 
for traditional knowledge and genetic material preserved through developing 
countries’ efforts at maintaining biodiversity, but on the other hand, also makes 
it difficult for them to prevent multinationals from obtaining patents on this 
traditional knowledge and genetic material in their own countries. These are not 
just theoretical possibilities: there have been some high-profile cases in which 
precisely these knowledge enclosures have occurred (for example in the case 
of the patenting of Indian Basmati rice in Texas (see, e.g. Stiglitz 2006).46 While 
for the most part these have not in any real sense prevented use of traditional 
knowledge, the fact that the system allows for such enclosures suggests a 
weakness.
Currently developing country populations are able to enjoy the benefits of seeds 
and traditional medicines developed over many generations without payment 
and there may be ways to promote knowledge commons in this regard.47   
These general problems have been by now well recognised, to the point that 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation has adopted its own development 
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agenda, beginning in 2004 and ratified in 2007 aimed at potentially altering 
the global intellectual Property Right regime towards enhancing welfare and 
growth in developing countries. Yet, despite increasing global attention to the 
need for balance in IPR frameworks, developing country interests continue to 
be compromised by broad expansions of IPR protections without sufficient 
safeguards for the advancement of basic development goals.
The problems generated by existing IPS is best seen by case studies and the 
ways that IPRs currently are leading to socially suboptimal outcomes. We turn to 
examine the cases of food security, educational material and climate change as 
informative examples.
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The pursuit of global food security has been a long-standing, yet elusive, 
development objective. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that some 
795 million people do not have access to sufficient food to lead a healthy and 
active life.48 The vast majority of the world’s hungry are located in the global 
South, with the highest prevalence of hunger occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where one in four people do not have sufficient access to safe and healthy food.
The right to food, sometimes alternatively framed as a right to freedom from 
hunger, has long been recognised as part of the international human rights 
framework. It has particularly come into focus over the past 15 years, with the 
publication of a General Comment by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in 1999, the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food in 2001, and the adoption by the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) of Voluntary Guidelines to Support Progressive Realisation of the Right 
to Adequate Food in 2004 (Helfer and Austin, 2011). In light of the centrality of 
food security to the achievement of all development objectives (UNDP, 2012), 
the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) aimed to halve, between 1990 and 
2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Although the international 
community has come close to achieving that goal (MDG Report, 2015), a lot more 
work needs to be done. 
The new post-2015 development framework, which was agreed on August 1, 
2015 and was formally adopted the following month, picks up where the MDGs 
left off. Goal 2 of the SDGs aims to “end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”.49 In contrast to the simplicity of the 
MDG framework, the SDGs more closely reflect the complexity of these objectives.
5. IPRs, Development, 
and Social Welfare
5.1 Food, agriculture and 
plant genetic resources
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A particularly important factor in generating complexity is the web of IPR that 
that governs the development, ownership and control of plant genetic resources 
(PGR) and biotechnological tools used in the agricultural process. Ownership 
over various agricultural inputs, including seeds, plants and their underlying gene 
sequences and varieties, is governed by what commentators have referred to as 
a “regime complex” of intersecting institutions, organisations and international 
and domestic instruments (Helfer, 2004; Sell, 2003; Helfer and Austin, 2011). Not 
only may a single plant be the subject of a large number of different types of 
IPR, each with a different owner, but those rights may also be subject to different 
rules managed by different institutions. Overlapping sets of rules for PGR 
ownership and use are managed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
FAO, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the International Union on 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), among other institutions. The 
nature and impacts of these intersecting frameworks will be discussed in further 
detail below.
One common element uniting these disparate institutions is their general 
promotion of ownership over plant materials – or what some commentators 
refer to as a tendency toward ‘hyper-ownership’ (Safrin, 2004). This can be said 
not only of the institutions that grant property rights to innovators, but also of 
institutions such as the CBD which seek to protect traditional knowledge and 
biodiversity by establishing national sovereignty over PGR (see further Halewood, 
2014). The increasing tendency toward ownership over genetic materials – 
whether by commercial innovators or traditional communities – stands in stark 
contrast to the treatment of these resources throughout history as the “common heritage of mankind” (see further Kloppenburg, 1988; Raustiala and Victor, 2004; 
Kho 2012). 
Up until the 20th century, plant breeding was almost exclusively the domain of 
public science. Seed was widely available, and “an economic environment closely resembling the textbook model of ‘perfect competition’ prevailed” (Kho, 2012 at 263). 
A natural feature of seeds – their ability to self-reproduce or propagate – made 
appropriation of investments in agriculture especially difficult, limiting private 
sector interest in the field (see e.g. Kloppenburg, 1988; Kho 2012). 
Interestingly, the earliest tools for appropriation were technological rather than 
legal. Hybrid corn, developed in the 1920s (as a result of public sector research), 
produced much greater yields than natural corn varieties, but exhibited serious 
reductions in yield when seeds were saved and replanted by farmers.50 This 
disrupted the natural barrier to appropriation and forced farmers to buy new 
seeds for every harvest. Kloppenburg (1988) attributes the entry of the private 
sector into agricultural research to this development.
The recognition of IPR in plant materials began with the Plant Patents Act (1930) 
in the US, and spread quickly to Europe and other advanced countries (see further 
Kuyek, 2001; Parfitt and Robinson, 2015). At the international level, plant IPR is 
regulated under the UPOV and TRIPS. The UPOV provides two alternative sets of 
rules for the protection of plant breeders’ rights (PBR), one created in 1978 and 
a second, stricter version in 1991. A plant variety is eligible for protection under 
these rules if it is new, distinct from other varieties, and meets certain uniformity 
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and stability criteria (see further Helfer and Austin, 2011). Under TRIPS, patents 
are optional for plants (other than micro-organisms) and for ‘essentially biological 
processes’ used in their production. However, member states must provide 
protection for plant varieties, by way of patents or an effective sui generis system.
In practice, the policy space left open by TRIPS for developing countries to devise 
their own sui generis schemes has not been utilised. Rather, most countries 
subscribe to the strong, TRIPS-plus protections contained in the UPOV rules. 
In some circumstances – for example in the case of Vanuatu – this has been 
mandated by WTO accession negotiations (see e.g. Forsyth and Farran, 2013). 
For other countries, adoption of the UPOV rules is required by FTAs (free trade 
agreements) with developed countries.51
Globally, plant patents and PBR are being granted in greater numbers each 
year (WIPO, 2014). However, the number of applicants is decreasing. A study 
by Howard (2009) indicates, for example, that 85% of transgenic corn patents 
and 70% of other transgenic plant patents in the US are owned by the top three 
seed firms, Monsanto, Syngenta and DuPont. Monsanto and BASF together own 
almost 50% of patents over stress-tolerant corn, soybeans, cotton and canola. 
Market consolidation is also occurring through mergers and acquisitions: 
although Syngenta rejected a $45 billion takeover bid by Monsanto in June 2015, 
the US seed giant is continuing to pursue the takeover (Bunge, 2015).52
5.1.1. Farmers’ rights and traditional knowledge
These trends toward greater protection for plant-related IPR, and the 
commercialisation and consolidation of agriculture that has followed, have 
significant food security implications. There is concern that market concentration 
spurred by increasing IPR protections has led to higher seed prices, threatening 
the economic independence of farmers and increasing the risk of indebtedness 
in the face of already unstable incomes (De Schutter, 2009, 2014). These 
observations echo the concerns of the farmers’ rights movement, which emerged 
during the so-called ‘seed wars’ of the 1980s (see e.g. Aoki, 2009). Farmers’ 
rights advocates argue that the increasing control of agriculture by a small 
number of companies raises prices and restricts traditional farming practices 
without compensating for generations of protection and care by farmers for the 
biological resources on which the inventions are based (see further Kloppenburg, 
2013). Throughout history, farmers have saved seeds from their own fields for 
replanting, exchange or sale, in a “millenary tradition whose legitimacy derives from the fact that rural producers have contributed to the creation, conservation, and improvement of genetic resources in agriculture for centuries” (Filomeno, 2013 at 
36). However, plant-related IPR generally make these activities unlawful. Farmers 
who cultivate protected seeds are regarded as licensees of that intellectual 
property, and can be found to infringe the underlying IPR even inadvertently (see 
e.g. Campi and Nuvolari, 2015). These suits are the most egregious - they arise 
from an uncontrolled externality, with the cost imposed on the ordinary farmer.
It is important to note that this process is not without substantial resistance. In 
recent years, traditional farming communities in both developed and developing 
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countries have become increasingly well organised and have achieved various 
successes in preventing further encroachments into their traditional practices. 
At the domestic level, strikes by farmers in Colombia in 2013 and in Guatemala 
and Ghana in 2014 achieved temporary retractions of policy changes that would 
have expanded plant IPR and other restrictions on farmers’ rights (GRAIN, 2014). 
Argentine farmers similarly succeeded in preserving their rights to save seeds of 
proprietary varieties for future cultivation (Filomeno, 2013, 2014).
The importance of biodiversity to food security and sustainable development is 
well established. A diverse biological gene pool increases the resilience of crops 
to disease and natural disasters, and their adaptability to a changing climate (see 
e.g. De Schutter, 2009, 2014). For this reason, target 2.5 of the SDGs requires 
countries “to maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species”. 
There is an extensive piece of research on the threats posed by the current IPR 
framework to biodiversity (see e.g. Correa, 2012).  As observed by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, patents and plant breeders’ rights “reward and encourage standardisation and homogeneity, when what should be rewarded is agrobiodiversity, particularly in the face of the emerging threat of climate change” 
(De Schutter, 2009). For example, for a plant variety to be eligible for protection 
under the UPOV 1978 or 1991 rules, it must be ‘uniform’ in terms of reproduction 
or propagation, and ‘stable’ such that its characteristics persist after repeated 
reproduction or propagation (UPOV 1978 Article 6; UPOV 1991 Articles 6-9).
These requirements discourage genetic diversity (see further Helfer and Austin, 
2011). Commercialised global agriculture is also increasingly focused on a small 
number of profitable crops: currently, only 15 crops provide 90% of the world’s 
food energy intake, with three (rice, corn and wheat) accounting for two-thirds of 
this.53
Note however that variety and biodiversity are global public goods like global 
knowledge. IPRs promote the advancement of global knowledge, but under 
current rules, at the expense of genetic diversity; and the lack of diversity can 
give rise to systemic problems - there is a large externality.
There is also extensive literature exploring barriers to access for follow-on 
agricultural research and development. All plant breeders, whether private or 
public, require access to existing stocks of genetic resources for research and 
development. However, these materials may now be covered by multiple IPRs, for 
which rights must be cleared before follow-on innovation can occur. Although the 
1978 UPOV rules permit second-generation breeders to use a protected variety 
without permission (Article 5.3), this exemption was narrowed considerably under 
the 1991 rules (Articles 14.5, 15). Patents often lack any research exemption 
5.1.2. Threats to biodiversity
5.1.3. Costs to innovation
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at all. Access concerns are exacerbated by the practice of ‘stacking’ multiple 
protected traits within one plant variety, in order to tie features that are going off-
patent to those for which protection is still in effect (see further Kloppenburg, 
2013), effectively evergreening intellectual property rights.
In 2003, the heads of ten US universities, together with several foundations and 
public research institutes, published an article in Science expressing concerns 
regarding the impacts of the system on their research activities. They stated:
To illustrate the complexity arising from fragmented IPR ownership, the 
authors cite the example of ‘Golden Rice’, a strain of rice genetically enhanced 
with vitamin A to address the prevalence in developing countries of vitamin A 
deficiency, the leading cause of preventable blindness in children and a major 
cause of morbidity and mortality.55 The presence of more than 40 patents and 
contractual obligations in respect of Golden Rice has limited follow-on research, 
despite a series of waivers to enable use in developing countries and for certain 
types of humanitarian research (Rüther, 2012).56 
Since the private sector focuses on large-scale cash crops such as corn and 
soybeans, this leaves the development of the subsistence and specialty crops 
most important to the developing world to a shrinking public sector. The current 
framework has eroded public research in several ways. As the license fees 
and transaction costs needed to clear rights for follow-on research increase, 
the resource-constrained public sector can be priced out of certain areas 
of innovation (Graf et al, 2004). Additionally, there is increasing pressure on 
universities to patent their own research and license it to the private sector for 
commercialisation.57 This can limit the independence of public sector research, 
impede some avenues of investigation, lead to reductions in public funding, 
induce more secrecy in the research process, and constrain the open diffusion of 
research findings (Glenna, 2015).
[T]he public research sector finds itself increasingly restricted when wishing to develop new crops with the technologies it has itself invented, including so-called “enabling technologies” – the research tools necessary for further experimentation and innovation. In agricultural research, applied research and genetic improvement of crops are derivative processes based on pre-existing plant material, and each incremental improvement now brings with it a number of IP and germplasm constraints that have accumulated in the plant material. When IP rights for agricultural materials and technologies are held by multiple public- and private-sector owners, this fragmentation produces situations where no single institution can provide a commercial partner with a complete set of IP rights to ensure freedom to operate (FTO) with a particular technology.54
46
5.1.4. International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture
There have been several attempts at the international level to address the costs of 
intellectual property rights regimes discussed above in respect of farmers’ rights, 
traditional knowledge, biodiversity and access to research inputs. To this end, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGR Treaty) 
was approved at the November 2001 FAO Conference and came into effect in 
2004. There are 135 contracting parties at the time of writing.  The PGR Treaty 
recognizes “the enormous contribution [of] local and indigenous communities and farmers… particularly those in the centres of origin and crop diversity”. Accordingly, 
Article 9 requires national governments to take measures to protect and promote 
farmers’ rights, including by protecting traditional knowledge, establishing rights 
for equitable participation in the sharing of benefits from the use of PGR, and 
enabling participation in national decision-making regarding PGR conservation 
and use. 
To address concerns regarding access to research inputs, the PGR Treaty also 
creates a virtual gene pool containing genetic samples for the world’s most-
used crops and making them available for research, breeding and training (see 
further Halewood, 2014).  At the time of writing, the gene pool contains 1.6 million 
samples. Public or private sector researchers from contracting parties can 
access the samples either free of charge or for minimal administrative fees. In 
return, royalties from commercialised products based on these resources are to 
be invested in a benefit-sharing fund used to support biodiversity, resilience and 
sustainability in developing countries.  To date, the fund has committed USD 19.6 
million to a range of projects.58 The PGR treaty also provides for a range of non-
monetary benefits, including information exchange, technology transfer, capacity 
building and facilitated access to crops.
Commentators are divided as to the effectiveness of the PGR Treaty in addressing 
the concerns discussed above. Parfitt and Robinson (2015) outline some of the 
key issues:
Parfitt and Robinson also note that, to date, grants made by the benefit-sharing 
fund have been from voluntary donations and not from the commercialisation 
First, limited coverage means that the Plant Treaty applies to most major food crops, but excludes minor ones that are more likely to be of importance to smallholder farmers. Second, access must be provided only for materials in the public domain, meaning that private companies or individuals are not required to provide access to the materials that they own and control, but they can access the materials that are made publicly available. Third, even where access is granted, it is only for conservation, research and breeding. Fourth, though it is not permitted to claim intellectual property rights over material accessed under the Plant 
Treaty, if a modification is made to the material, it is possible to apply for such protection.59
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of varieties developed from the gene pool’s materials. This may be because 
breeders are obtaining PGR samples from non-parties such as universities, 
private gene banks, private landholders, or the US Department of Agriculture (the 
US has signed but not ratified the Treaty). 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which has 196 contracting 
parties at the time of writing, recognises national sovereignty over genetic 
resources and subjects access to the prior informed consent of the State 
providing the resources. It thereby aims to give effect to three main objectives: 
biodiversity conservation, sustainable use of resources, and fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from such use. There is rich literature on the 
impacts of the CBD, regarding both its successes in addressing ‘bio-piracy’ and 
concerns that its establishment of national sovereignty represented the final, 
fatal blow to the traditional conception of genetic resources as the common 
heritage of mankind (see Subramanian and Pisupati, 2009; Robinson, 2010; Kho, 
2012; Kloppenburg)
In October 2014, the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD60 came into effect, with 62 
contracting parties at the time of writing. The Nagoya Protocol expands upon the 
text of the CBD by detailing obligations in relation to access and benefit-sharing. 
It is intended to create greater legal certainty and transparency for providers 
and users of genetic resources by establishing more predictable conditions 
for access and benefit-sharing. Whether it succeeds in doing so will depend on 
national implementation (see further Oberthür and Rosendal, 2013; Morgera et 
al, 2014). 
On a national level, it may also be open to developing countries to make more 
sophisticated use of the available flexibilities under TRIPS (i.e. the elements of 
discretion that are left to national governments in the design and implementation 
of their IPR regime). Correa (2012) provides a thorough treatment of these 
flexibilities, and recommends a variety of options for developing countries, 
including exclusion of plants, varieties and essentially biological processes 
from patentability, rigorous criteria for the granting of patents when they are 
allowed, express exceptions to protect the interests of farmers and researchers, 
and compulsory licenses for certain uses of PGR in the course of breeding and 
research.
Summary
Agricultural IPR poses high costs to the economic independence of the rural poor 
and the biodiversity and resilience of plant life. A small number of developed 
5.1.5. Nagoya Protocol to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity
5.1.6. TRIPS flexibilities
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country companies have enormous market power within the global food system, 
and the public sector on which the world’s poor rely for subsistence research 
and development is shrinking in their wake. Thickets of IPR complicate access 
to fundamental research inputs, and farmers have been disempowered from the 
community practices that have been the lifeblood of agriculture for thousands of 
years. 
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Climate change is one of the most pressing – and most complex – challenges 
of our time. A recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) describes the current and projected future impacts of the phenomenon, 
and its disproportionate effects on the poor (IPCC, 2014). As sea levels rise, 
millions in densely populated coastal areas and island nations, including in the 
Pacific and South Asia, will lose their homes. For the 70% of the world’s poor for 
whom agriculture is the main source of income, crop failures caused by floods, 
droughts and disease will be devastating. Volatile weather, part of greenhouse 
gas induced climate change, is projected to destroy food sources, impact health, 
disrupt economic growth, and limit access to essential services. In short, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that “[c]limate change is regressive – awful for the rich, but catastrophic for the poor” (Busch, 2014).  
In light of the fact that “[t]he problem of rapid climate change is inextricably linked with the challenges of development”,61 the SDG framework addresses 
climate change both directly, through a targeted goal, and by mainstreaming 
climate action throughout the development agenda. The preamble to the SDGs 
recognises that climate change has the potential to “undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development” and that, as a result, “[t]he survival of many societies, and of the biological support systems of the planet, is at risk”. Twelve 
of the SDGs underscore the importance of climate action.
Again, the design of IPR regimes – in developed and developing countries alike – 
will be an important factor in the success or failure of countries in meeting these 
objectives. 
There are several key intersection points between IPR, climate change and 
development that policymakers should take into account. 
The first is the extent to which IPR facilitates or impedes the development and 
global diffusion of technologies that might reduce greenhouse gas emission or in 
other ways mitigate climate change (for short, we call such technologies “climate 
change technologies.” Secondly, as highlighted in the section on agriculture 
above, poorly designed IPR may exacerbate the impacts of climate change, for 
example by reducing biodiversity and thereby limiting agricultural resilience and 
adaptability. To quote the then special counsel for the Australian Government 
Solicitor, “[w]hen one thinks about what is at stake, there is no more important role for today’s intellectual property systems than to generate solutions for a problem that could inflict an awful calamity on the human race.  One could get passionate about this topic” (Rimmer, 2011).
However, the relationship between IPR and climate policy has received only 
relatively recent attention. Reichman et al. (2014) suggest that this may be 
5.2 Climate change
5.2.1. IPR and climate change
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because of the mismatch between incentive-based justifications for IPR, which 
presume appropriate market signals on the demand side, and the challenge of 
green innovation, which has been characterised by a lack of appropriate pricing 
for high-emitting technologies and therefore an absence of an appropriate 
demand signal. They suggest that the relationship between IPR and climate 
change will become increasingly relevant as interventions such as carbon taxes 
and cap and trade systems address the demand side problem.
As noted above, one major point of intersection relates to the role of IPR in the 
transfer of climate technologies to developing countries. Technology transfer 
has been a key pillar of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) since its inception. Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC requires 
developed countries to “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties”. In 2007, the Bali 
Action Plan also identified technology transfer as one of four key priority areas. 
Subsequent negotiations resulted in a Technology Mechanism to facilitate 
global transfer of technologies for climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
Consistent with this, the original Rio agreement provided for compulsory licenses 
for climate change technologies.62 In recent years, however, developing countries 
have argued that these efforts may be impeded by poorly designed IPR regimes, 
particularly in relation to patents.
Beyond the direct and obvious consequence - the level of emissions is higher 
than it otherwise would have been - there is an indirect effect: the developing 
countries are less likely to agree to tough obligations in emission reductions, 
since meeting those obligations may entail their making large transfers to the 
developed countries which own the IPR necessary to meet those obligations. Of 
course, without an agreement, the entire world is put at risk. 
Rimmer (2011) provides an overview of the negotiations regarding IPR in the 
lead-up to the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009 
and Cancun in 2010. Developing countries sought to introduce flexibilities into 
the international patent framework to lower prices and increase flexibility in 
the use and adaptation of key climate change technologies. Brazil, India, China 
and South Africa, which were already emerging as new hubs for innovation and 
manufacture of green technologies, identified patents as barriers to access and 
pushed for compulsory licenses.63 Other proposals included the creation of a 
‘Global Technology Pool for Climate Change’ (see e.g. Shashikant, 2009) and a 
declaration on IPR and climate change comparable to the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (see e.g. Abbott, 2009). The Third World 
Network argued for the exclusion of climate technologies altogether from patent 
protection (see e.g. TWN, 2009).
The proposals predictably met with strong opposition from developed countries. 
The US delegate stated: “we cannot and will not support discussions that seek to undermine enforcement of IPR. It is an essential building block for innovation”.64 
The Australian government asserted “ownership of IPR is not a significant barrier to technology cooperation and use” and argued instead for measures to increase 
incentives for private sector engagement in technology transfer.65 Ultimately, the 
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negotiations failed to bring the parties closer together, and the outcomes of these 
meetings, including the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, made no mention of IPR 
(Rimmer, 2011).
Latif (2015) discusses subsequent attempts by developing countries to gain 
traction on the issue.  India attempted unsuccessfully to add IPR to the agenda 
of COP in Durban in 2011 and in Doha in 2012. In Warsaw in 2013, the group 
of Like Minded Developing Countries in Climate Change (LMDC) proposed that 
the UNFCCC’s financial mechanisms should be used to fund patent buy-outs and 
pay licensing fees. Proposals were also made for the executive committee of the 
Technology Mechanism to participate as an observer at WIPO and WTO meetings. 
Outside the UNFCCC context, developing countries have sought to bring the issue 
before the TRIPS Council of the WTO. The issue was first raised by Ecuador in 
March 2013, and the matter has been discussed in several subsequent TRIPS 
Council meetings. However, the discussions have reflected the same diametric 
oppositions that scuttled the COP negotiations on IPR and climate change (see 
e.g. TRIPS Council, 2014). The stalemate between developed and developing 
countries has remained intransigent, and progress on these issues has been 
negligible.
There is also a second divide emerging in relation to what should be done about 
the stalemate. Some commentators argue that the urgency of decisive climate 
action means there is no time to spare debating murky issues such as the role 
of IPR (see e.g. Cheyne, 2010). Others contend that it is this very urgency that 
demands erring on the side of diffusion, particularly since “[p]romoting green growth in developing countries is typically more about catch-up innovation and the diffusion and adaptation of already-existing technologies than about frontier innovation” (World Bank, 2012). There is a further peculiarity in the way that the 
global trade regime interacts with the global innovation system and efforts at 
limiting global climate change.  Public support for private research through IPR is 
encouraged, but direct public support for research may be considered an unfair 
subsidy - even though such research produces a global public good. For example, 
in 2012, the US imposed duties on the importation of solar panels from China, 
arguing that they were unfairly subsidised - thus leading to increased US carbon 
emissions than might have occurred if such duties were not imposed.66
5.2.2. Empirical evidence
Measuring the relationship between IPR and climate change innovation is 
complicated by several factors. For one thing, the relevant technologies run 
the gamut from alternative energy sources and the products that use them, to 
environmental control systems and early warning mechanisms. Most of the 
available research is based on case studies in particular fields such as solar 
photovoltaics, biofuels, wind and other key energy markets. Secondly, several 
confounding variables impact the responsiveness of any given market to IPR. 
These include the stage of development of the market in question (see e.g. 
Ockwell et al, 2010) as well as market structure and the extent of competition both 
within and across markets (see e.g. Barton, 2007). In the context of technology 
transfer, the recipient country’s absorptive capacity will also be a relevant factor 
(see e.g. Kim 2002).
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In addition to the limited case studies available, there are a number of patent 
landscapes that attempt to measure the impacts of climate-related IPR in the 
developing world. Most notably, the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP), European Patent Office (EPO) and International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) conducted a joint project on the role of patents 
in the transfer of mitigation technologies. The project’s outputs included a 2013 
report on Africa (UNEP-EPO, 2013) and a 2014 report on Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) (UNEP-EPO, 2014).  Both concluded that since there are very low 
levels of patenting in these regions – with less than 1% of patent applications 
for clean energy technologies being filed in Africa, and less than 3% in LAC – the 
impacts of IPR in these regions is negligible. However, the average rates used 
by these studies obscure high levels of patenting in particular economies within 
these regions. For example, South Africa accounted for 84% of all observed 
patent activity in Africa, and Brazil accounted for 73% of the activity in LAC. It 
is worth considering the impact of IPR independently in these countries. In 
addition, patenting rates throughout these regions are also likely to rise as local 
development capacity increases.
The evidence available to date does not appear to suggest that IPR has strong 
general impacts on technology diffusion. An often-cited empirical study by 
Barton (2007) concludes that there is enough competition in each of the solar 
photovoltaic, wind and biofuel markets to keep prices low and limit the monopoly 
impact of patents in these fields. Similar conclusions have been reached in 
relation to the markets for hybrid vehicles, energy efficient technologies in small 
and medium enterprises, and integrated gasification combined cycle technologies 
(IGCC) (Mallet et al, 2009). Emerging producers in India and China are generally 
able to obtain licenses from developing countries for relevant technologies, and 
in some cases, have even made strategic acquisitions of developed country firms 
to improve access (Lewis, 2007).67
5.2.3. Barriers to access cutting-edge research
However, the available studies do raise concerns regarding a particular facet of 
access. A review of the literature by Ockwell et al (2010) discusses a tendency 
for patent owners in developed countries to refuse to license technologies at the 
cutting edge of research, for fear of enabling developing country competitors. 
For example, patent owners for new thin film solar photovoltaic technologies and 
new enzymes for biofuel production may be hesitant to make these available, 
and have sufficient market power to price developing countries out of the market 
(Barton, 2007). Lewis (2007) notes that leading wind technology firms in China 
and India have been had to license technologies from second-tier developed 
country firms, due to a reluctance by leading companies to enable competition. 
In a series of studies conducted by Ockwell et al and Mallett et al, Indian firms 
raised similar concerns in relation to the markets for hybrid vehicles and IGCC.   
If the objective of technology transfer is simply the diffusion of relevant 
technologies, then access to research at the cutting edge may not be an important 
issue. However, if the concern is to enable developing countries to assimilate 
those technologies and increase their own innovative capacity, this becomes 
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a much bigger problem (see further Ockwell et al, 2010). That is to say, if the 
primary objective is to create learning societies, then policymakers should be 
concerned with these reported barriers to learning (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014).
Summary
Developing countries have made many attempts in recent years to put the 
relationship between IPR and climate change on the table. Although the limited 
evidence does not yet appear to demonstrate general negative impacts on access, 
evidence that IPR may be used to price developing countries out of cutting 
edge climate research should be taken seriously by policymakers concerned to 
enhance the learning capacities of developing economies.
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Access to education has long been recognised by the international community 
as the birth right of every child, irrespective of geographical location or 
socioeconomic status. The right to education is in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948) (Article 26), and reinforced in many subsequent 
international human rights instruments including the International Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Right of 
the Child (see further Helfer and Austin, 2011). The goal of achieving free 
education for all, spanning from early childhood to adulthood, was reaffirmed 
at the World Education Forum in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990 and again in Dakar, 
Senegal in 2000. Education is increasingly recognised as a fundamental tool for 
development, with demonstrated positive impacts on poverty reduction, health 
outcomes, economic growth, equality, democracy and political stability (see e.g. 
Center for Global Development, 2002 or Rens et al 2001). 
The MDGs aimed to achieve universal primary education. The international 
community has made progress toward this goal, with a net enrolment rate of 
91% in developing countries in 2015, up from 83% in 2000 (MDG Report, 2015). 
The SDGs go much further than this, aiming to “ensure inclusive and equitable 
quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all” (Goal 4). 
This commitment extends not only to access but also to the quality of education, 
which depends on a number of factors that will be considered below. The 
targets that accompany the goal also make clear that it extends beyond primary 
schooling to secondary and tertiary education, including vocational training 
and university, and that access must extend to the most vulnerable, including 
persons with disabilities and indigenous peoples (Targets 4.3-4.5). In addition 
to the standalone education goal, access to education is also mainstreamed 
within other SDGs – for example, target 3.7 requires countries to ensure universal 
access to sexual and reproductive health education.
A fundamental component of the right to education is access to high quality 
textbooks and other learning materials. A growing body of evidence confirms 
the integral role of such materials in improving student achievement (see e.g. 
UNESCO, 2015; Shabalala, 2011), with some studies suggesting that the provision 
of textbooks has a greater positive effect on learning outcomes than any 
other educational input (see e.g. Helfer and Austin, 2011, p334 5). Educational 
materials are particularly important in developing and least-developed countries, 
where students have less access to other resources such as teaching staff and 
after-school support (see further Štrba, 2012). The Dakar Framework for Action 
identifies access to affordable textbooks and learning materials, including in 
indigenous languages, as critical to achieving access to quality education in the 
developing world.68   
In many developing countries, however, the cost of textbooks and other learning 
materials can be prohibitive. UNESCO’s 2015 Education for All report identifies 
textbook scarcity as a serious challenge affecting the quality of education in 
5.3. Education and IPRs
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developing countries, with shortages worsening in some countries over the 
past decade. Between 2000 and 2007, for example, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe each reported an increase of at least ten percentage points in the 
proportion of students who either had no textbook for a subject or had to share 
with at least two other pupils. In Cameroon, there is approximately one reading 
textbook available for every 12 grade two students and one mathematics text per 
14 students. Even when there are theoretically a sufficient number of textbooks 
available, their general scarcity can lead to behaviours of hoarding and non-
use, for fear of loss or damage. Of course, developed countries are not immune 
from the impacts of high textbook costs either – in the US, where most students 
receive textbooks ‘for free’ as part of the public education system, textbooks are 
often out of date and in short supply (Chon, 2007).
5.3.1. Copyright and access to educational materials
Copyright is one of several factors contributing to the cost and scarcity of learning 
materials in developing countries. The Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) defines minimum standards and 
criteria for protection, including a minimum copyright term spanning the life of 
the author plus 50 years for literary works such as textbooks (Article 7). The 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner include both reproduction and translation 
of the relevant works. TRIPS requires WTO member states to comply with the 
Berne Convention, whether or not they are signatories to it. A third instrument, 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), came into force in 2002 and deals with 
copyright in the digital space, most controversially requiring signatories to enact 
prohibitions on the circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs). 
As with patent rights, the minimum international copyright standards have been 
expanded under subsequent bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements. 
In one sense, copyright should theoretically impose a lesser burden on access 
than patents. This is because copyright is intended to protect only the expression 
of an idea, not the idea itself (see for e.g. Samuels, 1989). In theory, then, copyright 
should be no impediment to governments or private actors commissioning 
their own textbooks to cover the same ideas as are found in more expensive 
developed country materials (Helfer and Austin, 2011 at 359). However, even 
taking into account nascent publishing industries emerging in India, China 
and parts of Africa, the resources and publishing capacity of developing and 
least-developed nations remain severely limited (UNESCO, 2015). By and large, 
developing countries are net importers of educational materials, and copyright 
therefore becomes closer to an absolute monopoly (Štrba, 2012). In any case, the 
so-called ‘idea-expression dichotomy’ has been criticised by many commentators 
as illusory and insufficient to provide a balance between the rights of creators 
and users of copyright materials (see e.g. Jones, 1990).
Differential pricing adopted by developed country publishers has to some extent 
mitigated affordability concerns, but has been insufficient to enable meaningful 
access (UNESCO, 2015). For example, a comparative price study of book prices 
in Indonesia, Thailand and the US by Consumers International (2006) finds that 
when considered in the context of a country’s GDP per capita, books become 
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prohibitively expensive. The report illustrates with an example: “[w]hen a student in Indonesia is made to pay US $81.70 for Goodman & Gilman’s The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, it is equivalent to a student in the US paying US $3,170.97 for the same book in GDP per capita and US $913.07 when compared using the GDP per capita calculated at purchasing power (PPP) exchange rate.”69
In addition, since publishers rarely grant licenses for the reprinting of their books 
in developed countries, up to an additional 40% relates to distribution costs that 
could be avoided if the book could be reprinted in Thailand instead of importing 
a new one.
5.3.2. Parallel importation
When publishers do grant licenses for local reprinting, books can be produced 
much more cheaply in developing countries. Nothing in the international copyright 
framework established by the Berne Convention, TRIPS and WCT prohibits parallel 
importation (the sale of legally produced books by way of unauthorised trade 
channels). In theory, there should be nothing preventing developing countries 
from purchasing legally produced books from India or China at cheaper prices. 
In practice, however, a vocal publishing lobby has made implementation of this 
flexibility difficult. In India, after a Parliamentary Standing Committee urged 
the government in 2010 to expressly permit parallel importation of educational 
materials, the proposed reforms were ultimately rejected “at the urging of industry representatives” (National Council of Applied Economic Research, 2014). 
Prohibitions on parallel importation are also a common feature of TRIPS-plus 
FTA agreements (for examples in the African context, see Armstrong, 2010). 
The Berne Convention and TRIPS also allow some policy space for countries to 
implement exceptions to copyright infringement in certain circumstances. There 
are two main types of exceptions that are relevant to access to educational 
materials. First, exceptions can be made for use of copyright materials for 
‘quotation’ or ‘illustration for teaching purposes,’ provided such uses are 
“compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose” (Article 10, Berne Convention). Secondly, a notoriously convoluted 
provision known as the ‘three-step test’ allows countries to enact general 
exceptions to copyright infringement “in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author” (Article 9, 
Berne Convention). It should be noted, however, that although the international 
framework mandates minimum requirements for copyright protection, it only 
permits exceptions to infringement – there is no minimum guaranteed protection 
for educational and other public interest uses of copyright materials. 
One of the broadest interpretations of the permissible exceptions is found, 
ironically, in the ‘fair use’ doctrine of US copyright law. Fair use allows certain 
limited uses of copyright materials without permission, including for the purpose 
5.3.3.Exceptions to copyright infringement
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of teaching, scholarship or research, provided such use is ‘fair’.70 Not every use 
of copyright material for educational purposes will be regarded as fair, and there 
is an extensive canon of US copyright jurisprudence establishing the boundaries 
of the exception. Certain general principles emerge, including a requirement 
that only limited portions of a work may be used in order to be considered fair. 
A narrower exception for ‘fair dealing for the purpose of education and research’ 
is available in some other advanced countries (see further Schools Copyright 
Advisory Group, 2012).
Many countries lack such protections for educational and other public interest 
uses. This is in part because the TRIPS-plus requirements that have been 
exported through bilateral and multilateral FTAs generally are not accompanied 
by corresponding flexibilities. In response to a recent inquiry by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC), for example, the Australian education sector 
advocated for the introduction of a US-style fair use exception into Australian 
copyright law, to better meet educational needs (see e.g. Schools Copyright 
Advisory Group, 2012). Despite a 478-page final report by the Commission 
recommending the reform in the strongest terms (ALRC, 2013), the proposal 
stalled in the face of major pushback from the publishing and entertainment 
industries both in Australia and the US.
In any case, even broad exceptions such as fair use are not a silver bullet for 
educational access to copyright materials. Many commentators have pointed out 
the inherent limitations of the doctrine, including in the education context (see e.g. 
Tushnet, 2004). Further, Štrba (2012) makes a compelling case that fair use does 
not suffice to meet the access needs of developing countries. This is because a 
use must be both qualitatively and quantitatively limited in order to be regarded 
as ‘fair’, whereas the problem in developing countries is the lack of affordable 
access to entire texts and translations. There is an extensive commentary 
discussing the scope of other potential exceptions that may be permissible under 
the Berne Convention’s three-step test, with many arguing that a more expansive 
interpretation would be available to address education concerns in developing 
and least-developed countries (see e.g. Harpur and Suzor, 2013).
5.3.4. Compulsory licenses
Following a major campaign by developing countries for more appropriate 
copyright rules to meet their needs (see e.g. Okediji, 2005), a compromise 
measure was agreed in the form of a 1971 Appendix to the Berne Convention 
(Berne Appendix) containing a compulsory licensing scheme for use of copyright 
materials by developing countries in certain circumstances. However, rather than 
addressing barriers to access, the Berne Appendix compounded the problems 
through its “labyrinthine process, complex conditions, and onerous terms” (Okediji, 
2005 at 162-3). Problematic provisions include waiting periods of three to seven 
years from first publication of a work before it can be licensed; termination of 
licenses at any time by the copyright owner; and different rules applying to 
reproductions and translations. The Berne Appendix is widely regarded – by 
advocates and critics of strong IPR alike – as having failed to address the needs 
of developing countries. Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), for example, have stated 
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that “it is hard to point to any obvious benefits that have flowed directly to developing countries from the adoption of the Appendix”.71
Summary
Education is a foundation for economic growth and human dignity. Affordable 
access to high quality educational materials is critical to delivering on the 
international community’s development objectives and obligations, including 
within the SDG framework. Copyright must be calibrated so as to remove unjust 
barriers to access, and to ensure that the most vulnerable among us can access 
the vast opportunities that a high-quality education provides. At the current 
juncture, multiple cross cutting intellectual property restrictions, especially on 
copyright, limit the full ability to access educational material globally.
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The Global IPR Regime 
and its Impact on 
Development
6.
Innovation, 
Intellectual Property, 
and Development:
A BETTER SET OF 
APPROACHES FOR 
THE 21st CENTURY.
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As the world turns to the Sustainable Development Goals to be realised by 2030, it 
is important to revisit the question of the current existing legal provisions and ask 
whether they continue to be fit for purpose in order to maximise human welfare. 
We have made the case throughout this paper that a) IPRs are only one way of 
incentivising innovation and there may be better and more effective ways to do so, 
b) the current system of globally binding intellectual property rights that seems 
to be moving towards increasing stringency is both theoretically indefensible 
and ethically unacceptable and c) careful case studies of critical areas show 
the serious limitations inherent in the current IPR framework. We now turn to 
the question of what civil society and concerned policy makers might advocate 
for as ways to deal with the current situation and alternative legal arrangements 
that could fulfil both the needs of developing countries and innovators, but most 
importantly to turn the intellectual property regime towards one which maximises 
social welfare given what we know about the current situation. While we do 
not expect that all countries will be able to undertake these options, influential 
countries such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa, for whom these may 
provide some alternative building blocks, may more easily champion them.
6. The Global IPR Regime and 
its Impact on Development
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Developing countries should use compulsory 
licensing of drugs and other patent protected 
items to the fullest extent possible, in order to 
minimise their payments to wealthy countries for 
innovation and creative work that already exists.
At the outset, it must be realised that the TRIPS agreement, despite creating an 
upward harmonisation of global intellectual property rights has inbuilt flexibilities 
that continue to be seriously under-utilised. For example, developing countries 
should use compulsory licensing of drugs and other patent protected items to the 
fullest extent possible, in order to minimise their payments to wealthy countries 
for innovation and creative work that already exists. It should also be remembered 
that developed countries have used compulsory licensing extensively in the past. 
The US has used them in the context of health emergencies (most notably they 
threatened to do so during the Anthrax scare of the early 2000s) and in some 
situations, are ways to undertake anti-trust enforcements as well as ways to 
break deadlocks between firms that served to weaken national security. Canada 
too has notably used compulsory licensing to take care of health needs. The 
best evidence (Scherer 1998) suggests further that compulsory licensing has no 
effect on the subsequent propensity to innovate for the firms whose products 
have been appropriated.
Similarly, to the extent possible the Bolar exception and similar exceptions should 
be utilised more extensively (China and Brazil for example have codified the Bolar 
exception in their patent laws).
It is in the interest of developing countries to resist any IP encroachment into 
areas that are not part of the TRIPS agreement (A corollary to this is that attempts 
to adopt TRIPS plus provisions through trade agreements should be resisted. 
These attempts often take the form of limiting trade with countries that adopt the 
flexibilities that exist in TRIPS or to add provisions that would limit the flexibilities 
in TRIPS (for example by promoting data exclusivity). This is of course a difficult 
task. As Deere (2008) notes, there are a strong set of factors weighing against 
these. First, there are economic pressures exerted by the USTR, including the 
threat of sanctions or other diplomatic lobbying that moves the system towards 
more rather than less IP protection. Indeed, this was more or less explicitly stated 
by the US Trade Representative who divided the world into won’t do and ‘can do’ 
countries, on the basis of their willingness to move towards the US position.
6.1 Use existing flexibilities in the 
current regime
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“As WTO members ponder the future, the US will not wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do countries” (Zoellick 2003).
Second, the technical assistance provided by WIPO in matters of interpretation 
of flexibilities have been relatively one-sided and in the interests of developed 
countries. As a result, resisting TRIPS plus agreements and trying to use the 
flexibilities provided by TRIPS is likely to be best attempted by influential and 
large countries such as Brazil, India or China for whom reciprocal threats are less 
intense. In addition, developing countries could benefit from access to shared 
expertise on maximising the legal flexibilities allowed under TRIPS.
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6.2 Use existing national patent laws 
to prevent weak patents/ maximise 
opportunity to contest patents.
As noted earlier, developing countries are given the ability to enforce their TRIPS 
obligations through their own patent offices. Developing countries therefore have 
the legal right to enforce high standards for patentability and must only act so 
as to not discriminate between domestic and foreign firms in the application of 
those laws. In several cases, these laws are reasonably stringent and if properly 
administered, may prevent weaker patents from being accepted. For example, 
laws preventing ‘evergreening’ of an existing patent or minor advances are 
particularly helpful. A simple example of the ways that domestic law can serve to 
limit excessive IP enclosure is given by the case of India’s patent system. In 2005, 
in spite of severe pressure from the multinational pharmaceutical corporations, 
India’s new Patent Act allowed for pre-grant opposition, broadened its scope 
and also allowed for a post grant opposition, as well as limited ever-greening. 
Furthermore, non-obviousness standards were kept high. That combined with 
patent laws that served to limit IP claims on things like naturally occurring 
substances created the space for opposition to weak patents. That noted, just 
enforcing the existing patent laws effectively is not enough to guarantee that 
there will be no weak patents. It is imperative that developing countries keep 
a reasonable list of ‘innovations’ that cannot be patented- for example, genes, 
molecules or business processes. The history of patents in the US and other 
developed economies suggest that these lacunae are often misused to the 
detriment of social development.72
As we argued in section 4, patent opposition has a public goods characteristic, 
and in the absence of serious monetary rewards that exceed the cost of challenge 
by several multiples, will typically be underprovided. This suggests the case for 
arrangements that make it easier to question the validity of patents and allow for 
an easy evaluation.  In this regard, the European Patent Office’s procedures in the 
event of a patent challenge seem a very attractive one. Rather than undertaking 
a full process of litigation, a patent challenge is sent before an appellate board of 
the patent office, which can consider the evidence and rule on the validity of the 
patent (Henry and Stiglitz 2010). This ‘second round’ evaluation works so as to 
elicit information on the reason for opposition and allows for a swifter resolution, 
which is important when the patent has been granted without due diligence. 
Developing countries therefore have the legal right 
to enforce high standards for patentability and must 
only act so as to not discriminate between domestic 
and foreign firms in the application of those laws.
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Whichever the mechanism, allowing for a more stringent evaluation procedure 
and maximising the opportunities to challenge the IPR (within reason) can help 
mitigate the poorly aligned incentive structures currently existing.
For new innovation and creative work that meet needs specific to developing 
countries, it is likely to be advantageous to use mechanisms other than patents 
and copyrights in many circumstances. One useful example is the Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDI), which seeks to develop drugs for diseases 
that almost exclusively affect people in the developing world. It is funded by 
aid organisations, private charities, and academia. The research is available on 
an open-source basis so that other researchers can quickly benefit from both 
positive and negative results and avoid unnecessary duplicative research.
For textbooks and other educational material, public financing of the production 
of the material is likely to lead to lowest cost for schools and/or students. This 
can ensure that the material is designed to specific needs for the country’s 
population and reduce the marginal cost to the actual cost of producing a physical 
company or simply relying on electronic versions. In this case, as with the DNDI, 
there should be substantial possibilities for collaboration among developing 
countries. For example, if university textbooks are being prepared for instruction 
in a common language, many countries can share in the expense of paying the 
author(s) and editorial team. A commonly produced textbook can also provide 
the basis for translated versions that would almost certainly cost considerably 
less than producing a new textbook.
In general, there is a much greater need and ability to promote research into 
underserved areas by thinking of prizes, grants and other mechanisms that take 
care of first copy costs. Other efforts include the Health Impact Fund (Pogge 
2010) and the World Health Organization’s attempt to create a fund for neglected 
diseases as well as the organisation’s proposal of a global health tax to fund 
research.
6.3 Promote alternative mechanisms 
For new innovation and creative work that meet 
needs specific to developing countries, it is likely to 
be advantageous to use mechanisms other than 
patents and copyrights in many circumstances.  
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6.4 Promote compensatory 
liability regimes
One major concern with intellectual property rights that we have not emphasised 
in this essay is that it serves to block follow-on innovation, even when the patent 
involved is not particularly useful by itself, but is useful in conjunction with other 
innovations. This has been observed especially in the context of high technology 
firms that possess multiple cross-cutting patents which are all needed to 
produce items such as computer chips. This has been called the ‘patent thicket’ 
problem or the problem of the anti-commons (Heller, 2008). Since one firm can 
prevent another firm from using its IP in a follow-on innovation, these blocking 
rights serve to impede innovation. But the principle carries over to other contexts, 
whereby follow-on innovation in any context is involved. In the case of developing 
economies, for example, it is easy to imagine contexts where there are some 
potential small innovations that could lead to better and more varied products 
localised to domestic conditions but which are prevented by IP owned by a foreign 
owner. In these contexts, having a regime of compensatory liability promoted by 
Jerome Reichman (Reichman 2004) can serve to improve welfare. Under such 
an approach, a patent holder is entitled to compensation for the use of their IP 
but he cannot prevent follow-on innovations. Injunctive relief for a violation of IP 
ownership is strongly limited but compensation is mandatory and automatic.73
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In the context of patent thickets, some have called for the creation of patent 
commons, whereby competing firms agree to open their proprietary intellectual 
property to each other in order to prevent blocking claims. Allarakhia (2013) 
reports on several current and planned knowledge commons, both private and 
public that serve to limit IP blockages. While these are at the current juncture 
entirely voluntary, there is a case to be made for extending such pools and 
commons in a much more extensive manner. Developing countries should try to 
provide as much support for open source and knowledge commons as possible 
within their legal framework.
6.5 Promote the development 
of a knowledge commons
Developing countries should try to 
provide as much support for open 
source and knowledge commons as 
possible within their legal framework. 
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Given the fact than developing countries have control over their national patent 
laws, it is important to have those laws limit the patentability of key innovations 
which form the basis of frontier research or which have critical importance for 
welfare. Governments in developing countries can consider particular exceptions 
in their existing laws to prevent patentability on a wide range of products; for 
example, genes, naturally occurring substances, computer algorithms or research 
platforms and tools.
Reichman (2009) points to a useful set of provisions that could be used as part 
of a national innovation strategy. First, when there is a frontier technology that 
is patented, countries can consider a research exemption for the use of this 
technology or platform. Alternatively, governments can make such technologies 
subject to a non-exclusive licence. A second provision would be to adopt an 
essential facilities doctrine that would allow the pooling of overlapping patents in 
key platforms. The essential facilities doctrine argues that there are key facilities 
needed for follow on research that should not be subject to blockage by the IP 
owner. In a wide range of new technologies such as nanotechnology or electrical 
engineering such a doctrine would serve to mitigate the problem of dampening 
innovation.
Relatedly, developing countries could recommit to the older (1983) agreement of 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation which stated that “plant genetic resources 
should be considered as a common heritage of mankind and be available without 
restrictions for plant breeding, scientific and development purposes to all 
countries and institutions concerned.” (FAO, 1983). Indeed, to the extent possible, 
such a view could be expanded to a whole additional set of genetic resources, 
including the human genome as well as to other naturally occurring substances. 
6.6. Limit patentability for a key 
set of innovations
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One of the key pathologies of the innovation system in the advanced industrialised 
countries is the continued privatisation of the knowledge commons. Institutions 
such as private universities have been encouraged to patent their work and to 
make licensing fees even when the public in the form of research grants has 
partially or wholly funded such work. This is most easily observed in the case of 
NIH grants facilitating medical breakthroughs that are then licensed or sold on 
to private pharmaceutical companies. Developing countries still have very large 
public sector involvement in funding research, much more so, typically than in 
the US or similar countries.
Developing countries should strive to keep the fruits of publicly funded research 
in the public domain. Thus, national innovation laws could consider some of the 
following possibilities.
First, the government should retain the right to use any invention arising from 
its funding, even partially, and to grant that right to others. This is particularly 
important for medical breakthroughs or sensitive technologies such as genetic 
testing platforms. Second, if publicly funded research is going to be subject to 
licensing, the government should weigh in favour of a non-exclusive licensing 
scheme so that a genuine commons may be maintained. Third, if these 
licensing agreements are seen to prevent or limit public interest objectives, the 
government should reserve the right to override and cancel such licenses. Fourth, 
while the creation of a market for a product generated by public funds should 
be encouraged, the government should retain the right to insist that consumer 
access is available in a reasonable manner. Again, in the case of medical 
breakthroughs, this is a critical clause. Finally, government can create funds for 
prize mechanisms that solve the problem of first copy costs and ensure that the 
product deriving from the prize is publicly available at a marginal cost.
6.7 Keep publicly funded 
innovation in the public domain
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Conclusions7.
Innovation, 
Intellectual Property, 
and Development:
A BETTER SET OF 
APPROACHES FOR 
THE 21st CENTURY.
70
Intellectual Property rights are a social contrivance. Like other property rights, 
they are subject to a certain set of limitations and restrictions. We have argued 
here that it is increasingly clear that the main reason to support this contrivance, 
at least in its current form - the idea that it will increase welfare and innovation 
- is questionable both theoretically and empirically. Intellectual Property rights 
are becoming increasingly badly configured in the developed world, leading to 
a stifling of innovation, distortions in the direction of innovation, and a reduction 
in the benefits which accrue from any innovation that occurs. Many of these 
failures arise because there is, especially under currently prevalent IPR regimes, 
no clear relationship between the social returns to innovation and the private 
returns. The proliferation of me-too drugs, the increase in patent hold-ups and 
similar excesses buttress the argument that the IPR system in the developed 
world is poorly configured.
Moreover, whatever the weaknesses and socially malignant outcomes that arise 
out of poorly designed IPRs in developed countries, they enormity of the problem 
their adoption causes in developing countries is much higher. The sine qua non of 
development is widespread and rapid learning and the current IPR system works 
expressly to limit the capacity of developing countries to adopt such a path. We 
have provided both general examples and specific case studies to make this 
case. But it is not enough to simply criticize the system; there is a need for clear 
alternatives.
Accordingly, we have provided some examples of policies that could be adopted 
that would increase the level of socially beneficial innovation and the social 
benefits that arise from the innovation that occurs, taking due account of both 
efficiency and equity. As usual, trying to push for a one-size-fits all approach, with 
attempts at excessive institutional harmonisation, is unlikely to be successful. 
Our hope is that at least some of these proposals have the chance to be widely 
adopted.
Intellectual Property Rights are not an end in themselves but only a means 
towards greater economic welfare for all. We tolerate and sanction known 
economic inefficiencies such as those that arise from the private monopolies 
that are created and sustained through the IPR regime as a gamble in this regard. 
Our contention is that this gamble has not paid adequate dividends. A substantial 
recalibration of the international approach to Intellectual Property Rights is 
required to ensure the advancement of the standards of living and well-being 
of the entire world—and to ensure consistency with development objectives 
7. Conclusions
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and obligations and to support those innovations that have the highest value in 
terms of their contribution to addressing the challenges facing our global society. 
As the world continues to move towards greater integration and becomes 
more interdependent and faces up to the pressing challenge posed by our co-
dependencies on each other, including global public health and climate change, 
these reforms will become more urgent.
A substantial recalibration of the international 
approach to Intellectual Property Rights is required 
to ensure the advancement of the standards of 
living and well-being of the entire world—and to 
ensure consistency with development objectives and 
obligations and to support those innovations that 
have the highest value in terms of their contribution to 
addressing the challenges facing our global society. 
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more productive long-term research ventures.
12There are ways of compensating those who challenge a patent, e.g. giving 
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1984 Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day period of exclusivity for the first to 
overturn a patent.
13This is called non-rivalrous consumption.
14In the US, the R & D tax credit was on incremental research. It was designed 
to provide incentives, while limiting the actual amounts of money that the 
government provided. 
15The World Health Organization has proposed a similar system at a global level.
16While the patent holder may charge a monopoly price, the patent holder may 
not engage in abusive monopolistic practices. Anti-trust laws impose limits on 
what a patent holder may do.  
17Such provisions were included in the TRIPS intellectual property agreement 
in 1995. At the same time, trade agreements have effectively strengthened 
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exclusivity”) restricting the use of data typically used in the certification of 
generics. The intent of these is to create an additional layer of monopoly, 
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efficiently.)  The net result though is that a disproportionate share of major 
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price for the drug would simply be transferring money from one pocket of the 
government into the other.
21In principle, there is supposed to be sufficient disclosure of information 
associated with a patent application that the research could be replicated.
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22The multiplicity of patents that might be relevant to any product opens up 
the likelihood of suits for patent infringement, which have become increasingly 
common.
23This is sometimes referred to as the “business stealing” motive for innovation.
24They might not, however, by full and complete, if the private contractor can use 
some of the knowledge gleaned to pursue related commercial projects. 
25A major criticism of the system is that not all of what is counted as research 
is really research—much of it is marketing research. Indeed, drug companies, for 
example have excelled in combining research activities with marketing, in ways 
that make it often difficult to distinguish the two. A further criticism is that the 
tax credit has not been part of the permanent tax code, so that firms engaging in 
long term research projects cannot rely upon it. 
26It would be necessary to have a mechanism that would prevent creative 
workers from using the tax credit system to establish their reputation and then 
switch over to the copyright system. This could be accomplished by denying 
copyright protection to anyone for period of time (e.g. 3-5 years) to anyone who 
had received funding through the tax credit system. A nice feature of this sort 
of rule is that it is largely self-enforcing. If someone seeks to get a copyright 
without waiting the required time period, they would simply find that their 
copyright would be unenforceable, since it would be a matter of public record 
that they had received support through the tax credit system. 
27This would be the case for end prizes, but it excludes milestones prizes which 
reward achieving some milestone on the way to an end prize.
28Under current regulations, a patent application is supposed to provide 
sufficiently detailed and complete disclosures of relevant information that the 
discovery could be replicated.  In practice, this is not the case.
29The fact that firms are risk averse and the returns from any drug are highly 
variable would enable the government to obtain the drugs at a price sufficiently 
low that the magnitude of the public subsidy for running the drug acquisition 
scheme would be markedly lower than the social surplus associated with ending 
monopoly pricing. Since the government is the largest procurer of drugs, a 
substantial fraction of the costs would be offset by procurement savings.
30An important concern is that since the monopolist receives his monopoly rents 
in the buy-out, there would have to be (distortionary) taxes elsewhere to finance 
his prize. However, if the state or an entity were to buy a few patents and sell at 
the competitive price, monopoly rents would be driven down. Thus, the price the 
government would have to pay would be smaller, and the distortion elsewhere in 
the system would be smaller.
31This would create a situation similar to the one that exists with a decentralized 
patent system where a company would have incentive to promote its drug 
as widely as possible since the size of the payments would increase as more 
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people use their drug. This could perpetuate some of the abuses of the current 
system, such as drug companies paying doctors to promote their drugs. 
Alternatively, the prize could be based on the potential QALY—the benefits that 
would accrue, assuming a competitive dissemination of the drug. The prize 
should be based on the expected value, as of the time the discovery is made so 
as to minimise additional risk to the researcher.
32There is some question as to what rights the government would actually be 
purchasing. Most drugs have multiple patents. In addition, in most situations 
they will have some period of exclusive marketing rights based on the clinical 
test results used to gain approval to market the drug. If the buyout takes place 
after the approval of a drug, then presumably the government is purchasing all 
rights related to the marketing of the drug, not a specific patent. However, this 
raises a problem in terms of disclosure. A pharmaceutical company that has 
purchased the right to use a patent needed for a drug may not have access 
to the underlying research. This means either that this research could not be 
released even after a buyout, or that the government would have to separately 
arrange to have a buyout of supplemental patents for which the drug’s 
manufacturer had only purchased narrow use rights.
33There have been a number of hybrid proposals, e.g. guaranteed government 
procurement, designed to ensure drug companies of a minimal level of sales 
revenues. Because they allow the return to the monopoly price after the 
procurement commitment, these schemes are inferior to those which entail the 
government simply buying the patent.
34The patent tax is in general neither the most efficient tax or the most equitable 
tax for raising the revenue required to finance research.
35The drug companies also engage in practices where there is “ethical 
ambiguity,” e.g. training programs for the use of the drug in an expensive ski-
resort, or paying the doctor to participate in the “research program,” thus making 
the doctor feel that he was an active participant in the success of bringing the 
drug to market. 
36In addition to the deadweight loss implied by the gap between copyright-
protected price and marginal cost, there are substantial costs associated with 
copyright enforcement.
37For a theoretical model, see Stiglitz (2014). For a discussion of the empirical 
evidence, see Dosi and Stiglitz (2014).
38There is an important implication of this: it questions the reliance on patent 
data as a measure of innovative activity.  Changes in the law (or differences 
in the law across countries) may result in more patenting, without any 
commensurate change in “real” innovation. A country specializing more in 
sectors which do not rely on patenting may be just as innovative as a country 
specializing more in sectors which do rely on patenting, even though there are 
marked differences in patenting. See, e.g. Stiglitz (2015). 
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39To make a tax credit system more attractive, the research results in the system 
could be patented and made freely available to others in the system, but not 
those who rely on patent-monopolies.
40One reason that wealthy countries have been concerned about the lack of 
IP protection in the developing world is that it could make it more difficult to 
enforce patents and copyrights in wealthy countries. If expensive drugs can be 
obtained at 1-2 percent of their patent protected price in developing countries, 
then patients in wealthy countries may go to developing countries for treatment, 
or alternatively, grey market sellers may find ways to smuggle the cheap drugs 
into the wealthy countries. As of now there have been no real effects in these 
regards that have reduced developed country markets.
41 42This is especially true from the standpoint of an individual developing 
country. While it is possible that the prospective rents from the developing world 
collectively may have a noticeable effect on the research pursued by drug or 
software companies or other innovators in the wealthy countries, the likelihood 
that the prospective rents from any individual country, except for the very largest, 
would have a notable impact is close to zero. The individual country would like 
to be a free rider. Curbing such free-riding is, of course, one of the objectives of 
international agreements. From a global equity perspective, however, there is 
an argument for allowing especially the poorest countries to free ride, implying 
that a development oriented equitable intellectual property regime would have 
allowed the poorest countries greater scope in issuing compulsory licenses. 
There is some validity to the concern that innovators and creative workers within 
a developing country may be motivated by the prospect of getting IP protection 
for their work. These effects are limited, since developed countries allow the 
issuance of patents regardless of the nationality of the patent seeker, and the 
large markets from which they could reap returns lie in the advanced countries. 
43Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
integration/documents/publication/wcms_079151.pdf 
44A typical case is where there are multinational pharmaceutical companies who 
will be litigants against a civil society group.
45See http://www.firstpost.com/business/novartis-patent-case-five-facts-about-
the-cancer-drug-glivec-680603.html for a short precis of the case.
46Tirole summarises this by suggesting ..”neglected or tropical diseases, such 
as malaria, tuberculosis, and leishmaniasis, that are of primary concern to 
developing countries, or more generally to diseases for which revenues from 
rich countries do not suffice to attract R&D funding. The corresponding vaccines 
or drugs are not developed because of low profitability due to the poverty of 
potential customers (perhaps combined with the fear of compulsory licensing). 
There are several illustrations of the shortage of research in the area: limited 
work on malaria and tuberculosis, and virtually none on sleeping sickness A 
widely circulated statistic is that since 1975, only 11 of 1,300 newly developed 
drugs relate to developing countries’ diseases, and five of them are by-products 
of veterinary research. The (off-patent) drugs against sleeping sickness date 
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back to 1917, 1939, and 1949 (a dangerous arsenic derivative) and also include 
an inadvertent by-product of cancer research. More indirect evidence that there 
is little R&D on poor countries’ diseases is the observation that there is much 
less research on vaccines than on drugs, despite the fact that the former have an 
important advantage over the latter in poor countries, in that they are much less 
dependent on a good health care delivery system.” (Tirole, 2006, pp 309).
47On this point, it may be useful to think about instituting and formalizing 
a traditional knowledge “commons” without patenting exlcusions (see 
in this regard Prabhala and Krishnaswamy 2016 (https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/17/opinion/mr-modi-dont-patent-cow-urine.html)
48World Food Programme, ‘Hunger Statistics’, https://www.wfp.org/hunger/stats.
49Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(finalised text, 1 August 2015), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/7891TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD.pdf 
50In many cases even if farmers save and replant GM seeds they may still have 
to pay royalties for the patent holder. For example, in Brazil, royalties were 
established at 2% of the production for “first generation” and at 7,5% for “second 
generation” regarding soy plants (on top of what they already paid to buy the 
seeds in the first place). This was validated in a court case, based on patent law.
51GRAIN (2014) at 7-13 provides a comprehensive listing of FTAs, arranged by 
region, which require parties to implement plant patents and/or the UPOV rules.
52Given the indication of strong concentration, one can look at other cases to 
see how best IP should be monitored in such industries.  When AT & T wound 
up a dominant firm in its industry, they were forced to share their intellectual 
property. One of the suggested responses to Microsoft’s emergence as a 
firm with large market power was to limit its intellectual property rights, e.g. 
by circumscribing protection to a shorter period, such as three years.  Such 
responses may be appropriate in this arena.  Individual countries could adopt 
such policies on their own.  
53FAO, “Staple foods: what do people eat?”, http://www.fao.org/docrep/u8480e/
u8480e07.htm.
54Science (2003) at 174.
55WHO, “Micronutrient Deficiencies”, http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/vad/en/.
56The issues here are closely related to those of the patent thicket for complex 
products (like advanced chips) where a myriad of patents may be infringed 
as one develops a new product, requiring complex negotiations impeding the 
developmental process.  
57For a list of measures similar to the US Bayh-Dole Act which have been 
implemented in developing countries, see Graf (2007).
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58The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
“The Benefit Sharing Fund in Brief”, http://www.planttreaty.org/content/benefit-
sharing-fund.
59Parfitt and Robinson (2015) at 295.
60Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilizatino to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Nagoya, 29 October 2010).
61Center for Global Development, “Climate Change”, http://www.cgdev.org/topics/
climate_change. 
62It is also important to recall that, as all TRIPS “flexibilities”, CL is not limited 
to health products. It can be used for any patent including climate change 
technology and can be used for any patent including climate change technology. 
(TRIPS, article 8: adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, 
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development).
63Rimmer (2011) pp. 48.
64Ibid at pp. 63.
65Ibid at pp.  64.
66In 2014 the WTO found the US guilty of violating global trade rules in this regard. 
67In effect, IPRs are a way to make developing countries pay for technology that 
has already been developed. The correct question therefore should not be whether 
we get more progress with clean technologies in developing countries with IPRs 
or no payments, but if we would get more progress if the same money were paid 
by the developing world through some other mechanism. 
68The Dakar Framework for Action, http://www.unesco.at/bildung/
basisdokumente/dakar_aktionsplan.pdf. 
69Consumers International (2006) at xii.
7017 U.S. Code § 107.
71Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006) at 957.
72An egregious example is the infamous case of Myriad Genetics and their rights 
over BRCA1, a human tumor suppressor gene.
73Interestingly, in the US recent court decisions (The E Bay decision) has already 
strongly limited injunctive relief. This will probably aggressive patent holders to 
use trade laws where injunctive relief is still possible.
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